BRIJENDER KUMAR Vs. LACHMAN DASS DUGGAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Brijender Kumar, appellant in this court, is the landlord of a premises bearing No. XVI/ 8254, Rohtak Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi. Lachhman Dass, since deceased, v/as a tenant in the said premises. On the 11th October, 1959, the landlord served the tenant with a notice terminating the tenancy. On the 20th May, 1960, the appellant filed an application for ejectment of the respondent from the said premises. The respondent died during the pendency of the appeal in this court.

(2.) The ejectment was initially sought on two grounds, namely (i) the tenant had acquired vacant possession of a residence in gali Shatra, Hauz Kazi, Delhi, and (ii) he had sublet the premises without consent of the landlord. The second ground was not pressed at any stage of the proceedings, and that is why Mr. K. K. Jain, learned counsel for the appellant, has rightly confined his arguments to the first point. Mr. Jain urges that the judgment of the Tribunal stands vitiated because of an incorrect approach on a point of law. The Tribunal found that the respondent had been in possession of the premises alleged to have been acquired by him for residence since the 27th December, 1952, and, therefore, he could not be said to have acquired vacant possession of a residence, after taking the premises in dispute on lease on the 1st April, 1953.

(3.) Mr. Jain lias referred to a decision of this Court in Gian Singh v. Surinder Lal and another. In that case Mahajan, J. took the view that : "There is no warrant for holding, the learned counsel for the petitioner would like me to as hold, that the premises must be built by the tenant when he was the tenant of the landlord." According to Mr. Jain this erroneous approach of the Tribunal has coloured the entire decision. I must confess that I find a lot to be said for the other view namely, the view taken by the Tribunal in this case. Acquisition, construction or allotment of a residence, before or after the commencement of the Delhi Rent Control Act 1958 (herinafter referred to as the Act), has been made one of the grounds for ejectment of a tenant by clause (h) of proviso to section 14 (1) of the Act. If one reads the language of the opening part of the proviso with clause (h) together, it appears to lead to the conclusion that the acquisition or allotment, etc., of a residence by a tenant must be after taking the premises, from which eviction is sought, on lease. It is said that if that be the view,then why did the legislature choose to use the words, "whether before or after the commencement of the Act." The answer is simple. Take a case where a premises was taken on lease in 1950 and a residence was acquired in 1952, what is, long before commencement of this Act. These words have been added to clause (h) to cover such a case, for otherwise it may have been suggested that to justify eviction the acquisition or allotment, etc., must have been after commencement of the Act, Every statute is enacted by the legislature for some purpose ; maybe to remedy some existing evil, may be to correct some defect, or maybe to create some new right or remedy. Consequently, in seeking to ascertain the legislative purpose the Courts have to resort to inter alia, the object of or necessity for the Jaw and the evil intended to, be cured by it. These various indications of the legislative purpose do not directly reveal the legislative intent or meaning but reveal why specific legislation was enacted. Nevertheless, the ascertainment of the lagislative purpose may be a step in the process of ascertaining the legislative meaning, since the reason for the enactment must shed a considerable light on the legislative intent. If the law-makers sought to effect a certain purpose, naturally such purpose should tend to reveal the meaning of the language used by them. When construing a statute, therefore, the reason for its enactment has to be kept in mind and the statute construed with reference to its intended scope and purpose. The Courts are enjoined to carry out this purpose rather than defeat it. If the language be unambiguous and the meaning clear, the statute must be accorded the expressed meaning without deviation. Departure from such clear meaning would constitute invasion by the judiciary of the provinces of the legislature, What then is the purpose of the present enactment ? The object of the Act is to regulate relationship between landlord and tenant and the availability of accommodation. It is in accord with that object to hold that what the legislature intended was to withdraw the veil of protection from a tenant who has acquired another residence after taking the lease of the premises in dispute. If a person has some residential accommodation and then takes a lease, the law seems to presume a justification for such a lease. That is why the words "acquired vacant possession of a residence" seem to have been used. Of course, if a tenant owns a house constructed by him before the disputed premises are taken on lease and the same falls vacant after the date of the lease, it may or rather must be said that the tenant has acquired vecant possession of a residence providing ground for eviction. But surely it looks too far-fetched to say that a tenant who had a premises in his possession and then rents the premises in dispute has "acquired vacant possession of............a residence." The word "acquire" according to Chamber's Dictionary means "to gain, to attain to." premises already in possession can hardly be said to have been gained. Moreover, all clauses insection 14(1), namely, (a) to (1) relate to acts or things after the commencement, of the tenancy. That would further lend support to the view I am taking. Normally, I would have referred this question for decision by a larger Beach, but it is unnecessary to carry the matter further in view of the fact that both the Rent Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal have found as a fact that the tenant did not acquire or build a residence as contemplated by clause (h) of the proviso to section 14(1) of the Act. Conclusion of the Rent Controller on this question is: "It, therefore, cannot be said that he acquired vacant possession of any residential premises." This conclusion of the Rent Controller was based on a finding that the premises in question were never residential, but were being used alt along for commercial purposes. The Tribunal, while generally affirming the said finding of the Rent Controller, also found, "As remarked above, there is no kitchen, bath and latrine in those premises. It is established from the oral evidence of the respondent that premises Nos. 4437/ 4488 are surrounded by factories and that these are being used for commercial purposes since 27th December, 1952." The appeal in this Court can only be confined to substantial questions of law. Since this finding, evern if assumed to be erroneous, is based on evidence, I am not competent to interfere with the same. That being so, the appeal would deserve to be dismissed.