LAWS(DLH)-2015-2-585

JUGJEEV SARNA Vs. STATE

Decided On February 18, 2015
Jugjeev Sarna Appellant
V/S
STATE Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) BY way of this petition, quashing of FIR No.282/2009 under Section 338 of IPC and Section 30 of Arms Act, 1959 registered at Police Station Punjabi Bagh, Delhi is sought on the ground that incident in question was purely accidental. While entertaining this petition, status report was called and now it is placed on record. Learned counsel for petitioner submits that the petitioner's pistol was a licensed one and while he was cleaning it in his bedroom, it accidentally went off and in the process respondent No.2, who is his wife and petitioner himself were injured. Attention of this Court was drawn to the status report, which shows that the licence of fire -arm in question has been renewed upto 10th July, 2015 and there was a grace period for renewal of the fire -arm, when the incident in question had taken place. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor for State submits that respondent No.2, who is the wife of petitioner got injured in the incident in question is present in the Court and has been identified to be so by SI Anoop Singh, who is the Investigating Officer of this case. Respondent No.2 -Mekhala Kaur, present in the Court, affirms the contents of her affidavit of 19th February, 2013, filed in support of this petition and submits that incident in question was purely accidental and there was never an ill intention. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor for State submits that charge -sheet in this case has been filed for the offence under Section 338 IPC, which is compoundable but offence under Sections 25 & 30 of Arms Act, 1959 are not compoundable.

(2.) THE parameters governing quashing of FIR have been dwelt upon by the Apex Court in a recent judgment in Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 2014 6 SCC 466. The pertinent observations of the Apex Court in Narinder Singh are as under: -

(3.) IN view of peculiarity of this case and affidavit of respondent No.2 -injured, status report placed on record and the fact that incident in question took place by mistake only and that no prima facie case under Arms Act is made out, I find that continuance of proceedings arising out of this FIR would be an exercise in futility.