DANVIR VERMA Vs. PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The Petitioner has prayed inter alia for the issuance of appropriate orders quashing (a) his suspension as well as (b) the charge-sheet against him, and (c) to restrain the continuance of the Domestic Inquiry instituted against him. After eleven hearings, an ad interim stay of the inquiry proceedings was granted on 14.5.1999. However, on 5.2.2002, resumption of these disciplinary proceedings was permitted subject to the condition that the final order passed would not be given effect to against the Petitioner. On 15.3.2004, the Petition was set down for final disposal. The learned Counsel for the parties have addressed detailed arguments in the matter.

(2.) The Petitioner has been acquitted of offences under Sections 420, 471/ 34 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code in terms of the Judgment of the Metropolitan Magistrate announced on 5.8.1995. The Respondent had also instituted a suit for the recovery of Rs. 93,325/- which has also been dismissed since the Civil Judge was of the view that the Defendant/ Respondent Bank had failed to discharge the burden of proof in respect of Issues which prima facie appear to be similar to those in the Departmental/Disciplinary Inquiry. Even in the face of these two judicial pronouncements, covering the criminal culpability as well as civil liability of the Petitioner, the Inquiry Officer, who is A Zonal Manager of the Respondent Bank, has returned the finding that the Petitioner had failed to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, devotion and diligence, that he failed to protect the interests of the Bank; had acted in a manner unbecoming of an officer of the Bank; and had acted in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the Bank, in his Report dated 24.9.2002. What will have to be determined at the relevant time is whether these charges differ in material content from the scope of the criminal and civil litigation. Kundan Lal v. The Delhi Administration, Delhi and Others, 1976 (1) SLR 133, was a decision rendered by a learned Single Judge of this Court in which it had been prayed that the disciplinary proceedings against the Petitioner should be dropped since he had been acquitted by the criminal Court in respect of a corrupt practice which was the subject matter of the charge-sheet also. The prayer was granted. Justice Rangarajan extracted and applied the extracted conclusions condensed in Shaik Kasim v. The Superintendent of Post Offices, Chingleput Dn. and Another, AIR 1965 MADRAS 502, where again it was found that the facts/ evidence and charges in both proceedings were the same; and the acquittal was 'substantially on merit' connoting the contra-distinction with grant of benefit of doubt: "(1) An administrative authority, in initiating disciplinary proceedings, is not bound to wait for the verdict of a criminal Court but where the criminal Court has tried the concerned person and acquitted him it would be improper and such a proceeding is liable to be quashed as not in consonance with the principles of natural justice if the administrative authority later initiates disciplinary proceedings on the identical facts, evidence and charges if the acquittal had been substantially on the merits. (2) There is no rigid or inflexible rule that a finding of a Criminal Court is conclusive in every sense upon the administrative authority. For instance, it may punish on the same facts for some lesser charge, which may not amount to a criminal offence but may well amount to a grave dereliction of duty entitling disciplinary action. This was illustrated by referring to a School Master being acquitted for a charge of rape of a girl student but still departmental action being possible against the school master for grave impropriety in his relationship with a girl student which would disentitle him to that office. (3) Where the acquittal is substantially on the merits, it will not be proper for a disciplinary Tribunal to record a finding of guilt on identical facts and charges and also to punish; this being a basic principle of jurisprudence the Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution would be justified in striking down the action based on such findings as not in consonance with principles of natural justice." After considering a plethora of precedents the learned Judge preferred the opinion "that when there is a substantial acquittal of the accused on a criminal charge there should not be a departmental proceeding against him in respect of the same charge on the same facts unless there are present conditions like the acquittal being on a technical ground or establishing conduct which would make it unworthy of the said office."

(3.) This very question has been discussed in great detail by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in jeevan Prakash Pandurang Mokashe v. State Bank of India and Anr., 1983 II LLJ 145, and the following passage from the judgment is worthy of reproduction: " .... But it is one thing to say that a domestic tribunal can come to a contrary or contradictory conclusion in regard to the same fact and another that an inference or conclusion drawn may follow differently from the act having different aspects for which the act or conduct is under inquiry. In one case the act or conduct is enquired into for the purpose of finding out whether an offence is spelt out under the relevant enactment or is not committed, while for the other purpose the question is as to whether the act committed renders the continuation of the person in the employment undesirable. While, therefore, more than one consequence is capable of following from the same act holding of an inquiry for the purpose of determining whether that other consequence has followed disentitling the person from further continuation or requiring his termination, is a question which can be legitimately gone into by a domestic tribunal, notwithstanding that no offence is disclosed. The areas, therefore, of the two authorities are clearly different. We do not, however, think that this Court in coming to this conclusion had held or opined that it would be permissible for the other tribunal to come to a contrary conclusions of fact. If it had been found by the criminal Court in Bhaura's case (supra) that no money passed from the hands of Limji to Bhaurao as a fact, then we have considerable doubt, and that is not what has been held, that it was possible for the domestic tribunal to hold as a matter of fact that an amount of Rs. 5 did pass from the hands of Limji to Bhaurao. It is this aspect of the matter and controversy which acquired considerable importance in the present case. With very great respect, we are unable to agree that the Supreme Court when it made any observation in Pritam Singh's case (supra) did not mean what it said. What was said in Pritam Singh's case (supra), following the observation of Lord MacDermo tt in Sambasivam's case was that verdict is binding "and conclusive in all subsequent proceedings between the parties to the adjudication." In terms of Art. 141 of the Constitution of India we think that the Supreme Court approved these observations and stated in its judgment that that is the law of the land and has to be followed and respected by every subordinate Court.