AJIT SINGH Vs. DIRECTORATE OF EDUCATION

JUDGEMENT

(1.) One of the questions which has arisen in these writ petitions is the interpretation to be given to Rule 117 of the Delhi School Education Rules, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the "Rules"). The increments of pay of the Petitioners have been withheld for reasons which the Management of the School has endeavoured to disclose for the first time in these proceedings. However, no correspondence was issued to the Petitioners putting them to notice, or requiring them to show cause why their increments should not be withheld. The principles of natural justice, therefore, appear to have been violated.

(2.) Learned counsel for the Management had contended that since the Petitioners assert that minor penalties have been imposed on them they ought to have taken recourse to the alternative remedy of approaching the Delhi School Education Tribunal. Counsel for the petitioners, however, draws my attention to Rule 119 of the Rules which states that no order imposing minor penalties should be passed except after informing the employee in writing of the proposal to take such action against him. However, no Notice has admittedly been issued. Where a Statute or extant Rules and Regulations have been violated, a writ petition is maintainable even though there may appear to be an alternative remedy. In my view the alternative remedy would apply to the circumstances which attended the imposition of a minor or a major penalty. Where the allegation and grievance is that the mandatory procedure has not been adhered to a writ petition would undoubtedly lie, so that such provisions are complied with. In these cases the Court does not touch upon the merits of the decision itself.

(3.) Learned counsel has relied on the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in L.R. Sharma v. Delhi Administration and others, 1982 Lab.I.C. 317, authored by Prakash Narain, CJ. In that judgment the Court took into notice the formation of the Management Committee prior to the coming into the effect of the Delhi School Education Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act"). Reliance is also placed on the judgment of the Full Bench in Master Vibhu Kapoor v. Council of Indian School Certificate Examination and another, AIR 1985 Delhi 142, where the Full Bench presided over by Prakash Narain, CJ preferred his earlier view expressed in L.R. Sharma's case (supra) to that of another Division Bench decision in Miss Kum Kum Khanna v. The Mother Acquinas, Principal, Jessus and Marry College, Chanakyapuri, New Delhi, AIR 1976 Delhi 35. In the last two decades considerable advancement has been achieved on the question of the legal propriety of issuance of writs by High . Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is now permissible to issue prerogative writs even in respect of bodies which may not strictly fall within the ambit of "State"as envisaged in Article 12 of the Constitution. There can be no gainsaying that a School which is running in compliance with the statutory provisions of the Delhi School Education Act performs a public duty or function. Even in respect of unaided schools, High Courts have issued writs in respect of matters such as scales of fees as well as admission of students. The Hon'ble Supreme Court had exercised jurisdiction even in respect of a minority unaided s'chool such as Frank Antony Public School, Delhi. It is to late in the day to assert that the extra-ordinary jurisdiction vested in the High Court cannot extend to such bodies.