UNION OF INDIA Vs. R P BUILDERS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This C.M. raises a question which, of late, has been arising day in and day out, in this Court. The matter is in regard to the condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 filed by the State Public Sector Pubiic Corporations and whether certain factors common to these bodies in their structure and administrative procedures have to be taken into accounts by the Courts while considering applications for condonation of delay. The matter has required review particularly in the light of the recent Judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. N. Das R. Israni (Civil Appeal No. 2480 of 1993) arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 417 of 1993 dated 12-4-93)(2) reversing the decision of this Court in Narain Das R. Israni vs. Union of India (1992 (1) Arb. L.R. 405). (1) In that decision this Court had taken the view that "if the Courts were to accept the mere procedure of working in Government offices as sufficient cause, then delay will have to be condoned almost in every case. There can be no discrimination between a common man and the Union of India for furnishing sufficient cause for condonation of delay." The same view was held by this Court in Kanishka Builders vs. Union of India (1990 [2] Arb. L.R. 197). (3) Learned cousel for respondent, in fact relied upon several rulings of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and in particular. Govrnment of Andhra Pradesh vs. Batchala Balaiah (AIR 1985 AP 52):(4) Spl. Deputy Collector vs. Nawab T. Yar June (AIR 1973 AP 43), (5) R.D.O. vs. T. Laxminarayana (AIR 1975 AP 109) (6) S. M. Hadi Jaffrey vs. Spl. Deputy Collector (1975) [2] Andhra W.R.7)(7). But now. we are. considering the matter afresh in the light of various recent rulings of the Supreme Court and in particular, in the light of the Supreme Court in Narain Das R. Israni's case wherein the Judgment of this Court "was reversed.

(2.) Before coming to the last mentioned case. we shall refer to some of the other recent rulings of the Supreme Court taking a similar view in favour of the State Public Sector. These cases fall in two cases. One category is where there is collusion between the officers of the StateiPublic Sector (including the Standing Counsel or Government Pleaders) on the one hand and the litigants who are fighting the case on the opposite side: or where these officers play fraud on the StateiPublic Sector. G. Ramesowda vs. Spl. L.A.O. Bangalore (AIR 1988 S.C. 897)(S) falls into this category. The other cases decided by the Supreme Court in favour of condonation of delay accept that the deay occurriag on account of govermental departmental procedures is sufficient cause. To this category belong State of U.P. vs. Bahadur Singh (AIR 1983 S.C. 845)(9) and Collector. Land Accuition. Anantnag vs. Katiji (AIR 1987 S.C. 1353)(10). In these cases. apart from holding that departmental delays and bureaucratic proce dures could be taken into account, it is also stated that the Court should keep 'public interest' also in mind. 'Public interest' is also treated as a relevant ground in Union of India vs. Cyanamid (AIR 1987 S.C. 1802)(11). Then conies Union of India vs. Narain Das R. Israni (S.C.) decided on 12-4-1993. These are cases not involving fraud or collusion but even so departmental delays are treated as relevant factors to be taken into consideration. In other words, these factors are not 'irrelevant'. In the State of U.P. vs. Bahadur Singh, the Supreme Court held that in matters such as a Land Ceiling law "there are no two parties as is the. case in a litigation between two parties wherein each would be prosecuting and watching the proceedings regularly. Further the departmental authority has to be apprised of adverse decision and further decision has to be taken whether the case is one required to be taken to higher court. Not that the departmental authorities charged with a duty to implement the law should not be vigilant; but one aspect cannot be overlooked that a departmental authority may delay the moving of higher court for oblique motives and public interest may suffer if such cause is thrown out merely on the ground of some delay which is also explainable. These are relevant considerations which must enter judicial verdict before rejecting such cause on the ground of delay." In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag vs. Katiji the Supreme Court posed the following question : "Whether or not to apply the same standard in applying the 'sufficient cause' test to all the litigants regardless of their personality in the said context is another.

(3.) The Supreme Court observed that the words 'sufficient cause' in Section 5 are adequately elastic to enable the Court to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice, that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. The Supreme Court said that though it had advocated a liberal' approach in this context.