MANSUKH CHHAGAN LAL BHATT Vs. UNION OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These matters have been referred to a Full Bench for the purpose of considering the correctness of the decision of the Division Bench in Subhash Chander vs. Union of India and others (1991 (43) DL.T 517). The said Division Bench there held that apart from the five contingencies mentioned in Alka Subhash Gadia (JT 1991 (1) SC 549) by the Supreme Court, there could be other grounds which could be urged by a person proposed to be detained under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Act (hereinafter called the COFEPOSA). On that basis, it was held by the Division Bench that delay in the execution of the detention order could be an additional ground upon which the detention order could be challenged by a person before the service of the detention order.

(2.) In the cases before us the main question is whether the grounds stated in Alka Subhash Gadia are exhaustive and if so whether delay in execution of detention order or delay in the passing of the detention order could be an additional ground upon which the detention order could be challenged at a pre-detention stage.

(3.) So far as the point before us is concerned, it is sufficient to notice that the order of detention in the first case was passed on 31.7.1989 and that it still remains to be executed even in September,1994. The writ petition was filed on 18.3.94. In the second case (Cr.W.P 279 of 1994) the incident took place on 18.5.93 and the order of detention was passed on 7.10.93 and still remains to be executed in September,1994. According to the petitioners, on account of the delay in passing the order or the delay in the execution of the order,the purpose of detention has gone and the nexus between the grounds of detention and the detention order stands snapped and the petitioner can challenge the order without surrendering. It is argued that the case comes within the third ground stated in Alka Subhash Gadia case, namely, that the detention order is "passed " for a wrong purpose and the Court could quash it on the ground that the order was "passed for a wrong purpose."