NARAIN SINGH Vs. FINANCIAL COMMISSIONER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Petitioners have in this writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India prayed for quashing of the two orders passed by Respondent No. 1 on 4th February, 1994 (i) while exercising powers under Section 72 of the Delhi Land Revenue Act, 1954 and (ii) while exercising powers in appeal under Section 185(4) of the Delhi Land Reforms Act and have also prayed for putting the petitioners in possession of the disputed land in compliance with the orders passed on 02.09.1992 by the Supreme Court in Special Leave Petition No.20143 of 1991.

(2.) The facts in brief are that an application under Section 85 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 was filed, by respondents 2 & 3 before the Revenue Assistant, which was dismissed on 04.06.1990. Feeling aggrieved, three separate remedies were chosen by respondents 2 & 3- (i) an application for restoration was preferred before the Revenue Assistant; (ii) an appeal was preferred before the Additional Collector; and (iii) simultaneously a revision petition was preferred before the Financial Commissioner, which was got dismissed as withdrawn on 05.07.1990. The appeal preferred before the Additional Collecter was dismissed on 28th August, 1991, against which further appeal was preferred before the Financial Commissioner, who on 12.12.1991 allowed the same by setting aside .the order of Additional Collector and made an order of remand with a direction to the Additional Collector and made an order of remand with a direction to the Additional Collector to decide the appeal afresh. It may be stated that respondents 2 & 3 claim to be in possession of the disputed property and on that basis are claiming Bhumidari rights therein.

(3.) Petitioners who claim to have purchased the suit property by two separate sale deeds dated 04.05.1981. form one Maman Singh, claim that mutations in revenue records were attested in their favour on 31.05.1989. After dismissal of the applications of respondents 2 & 3 a civil suit was preferred by the petitioners in which an application under Order 39 Rules 1 .& 2 was made for grant of tem- porary injunction. This application was dismissed by the Trial Court on 29tfh June, 1990. An appeal preferred against the said order was dismissed by this court on 18.12.1991. The judgment is reported as Narain Singh Vs. Mahinder Singh etc. (1992 RLR 52). Matter was taken up by the petitioners to the Supreme Court by way of Special Leave Petition No-20143/91 in which on 24.12.1991 and interim order was made directing the parties to refrain from entering the land till 10.01.1992. The Station House Officer, Police Station, Samaipur Badii was directed to take charge of the disputed land till 10.01.1992 who was also directed to ensure that none of the parties would enter into possession. Special Leave Petition was dismissed on 23.01.1992. While dismissing the special leave petition, the Revenue Assistant was directed to conclude the proceedings which were stated to be pending before him under Sections 84/85 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act within four mont. Interim order passed on 24.12.1991 was also vacated. It ap- pears that an application was moved subsequently before the Supreme Court on which an order was made on 02.09.1992 as regards possession of the suit property There was dispute among parties as to which of the parties possession had to be delivered after dismissal of the petition. Petitioners were claiming to be in possession and so respondents 2 & 3. The Court directed that Respondent No.2 be handed over possession of the land within two weeks and further directed that Revenue Assistant would decide the issue between the parties independently as to which of the parties had been in possession prior to the police taking over possession. It was directed that ultimately the possession would be delivered to the party entitled thereto. The said order reads as under : "This application has arising out of the special leave petition which was against an interlocutory order. While issuing notice on the Special leave petition this Court on December 24, 1991 directed as under: