MADAN LAL Vs. AMAR NATH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This petition under Section 482 of the Code by the husband, his parents, brother and sister-in-law, is directed against proceedings in a complaint filed by the wife's father against them for offences '"under Section 2 and 3" of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge reversing in revision the order of the trial court by which the trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the "offences" alleged were not committed at Delhi, and had, if at all, been committed at Jullundur, and the Delhi Court, therefore, had nojurisdiction to entertain or tiy the complaint.

(2.) Kamlesh and Madan Lal, the first petitioner herein, were married at Delhi. Their marital life had apparently been unhappy, either because of persistent demand for gifts from the wife's in-laws, as alleged by one party, or because of incompatibility and other reasons, as is the contention of the other. Be that as it may, on or before October 1, 1982, Madan Lal, the husband filed proceedings in a Jullundur Court, which is the situs of the matrimonial home, for a decree of divorce, inter alia, on the ground of cruelty, based on allegations that the wife withdrew from the matrimonial home without reasonable cause and carried with her the entire jewellery and costly clothes and had been committing "grave acts of cruelty" during the period she lived with the husband. It was further alleged that with a view to forestall any action of restoration of jewellery, which she had carried, she set up a "false story of a theft" in the house of her father and lodged a false first information report at a local police station in Delhi based on a fake theft. It is not clear as to when the wife was served with the process of the Jullundur Court. The complaint, out of which the present proceedings have arisen, was, however, filed by the wife's father Amar Nath, in the Court of Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi, on of about October 30, 1982. Besides the husband, his parents, his brother and the brother's wife were impleaded as accused persons. According to the complaint, which is rather clumsily drawn, "all the five accused persons are greedy persons and since inception of relationship either of them used to make in certain manners dowry demands absolutely undue". It was further alleged in para (4) that "at the time of marriage and on other occasions before marriage Sh. Babu Lal accused demanded one thing or the other and undue cash and to save his position in his. social life, he did expenses beyond his capacity in the marriage and paid cash, articles, ornaments, etc. etc. supply to satisfy his desires". The complaint proceeds to make further allegations of undue demands from the wife from time to time on different occasions at Jullundur and it is claimed that the husband has been able "to collect about Rs. 20000.00 from the complainant by demanding dowry from complainant absolutely undue." The learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, who took cognizance of the complaint, examined the father of the wife, as well as the wife. In the course of his statement the father slated that "At the time of finalization of the marriage accused No. 1 to 5 represented that they would not seek any dowry but soon after the solemnization of the marriage, they started making demands I had tried to fulfil the demands of the accused according to my means yet they were not satisfied. Whenever my daughter met me, she told me that she was being tortured and harassed and that whenever I learnt about the torture about my daughter from other sources, I went to Jullundur, the marital house of my daughter and paid in cash. Thus in this way accused No. 1 collected about Rs. 25000.00 from me, they made demands from me." In her statement, the wife alleged that "the accused persons made undue demands of dowry. All the accused pressurised me to bring cash from my parents as they had not given T.V , Scooter, etc. My father paid Rs. 2500.00 as price of the T.V. After sometime of the marriage, my husband accused Madan Lal, sold away his scooter and asked me to request my father to give me a new scooter, on which I approached my father who gave about Rs. 8000.00 to my husband in instalments for the purchase of the scooter." She made other allegations but they all relate, as some of the instances referred to earlier, to the period subsequent to the marriage, and in relation to the demand made at Jullundur. By and order of December 20, 1982, the Court found sufficient grounds to proceed against all the accused persons under Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and directed them to be summoned. On a preliminary objection with regard to the lack of jurisdiction, the Metropolitan Magistrate, who' was then seized of the matter, made an order on July 25, 1983 dismissing the complaint on the ground that on a perusal of the complaint and the evidence, it was clear that the "offence was never committed at Delhi and the same, if any, was committed at Jullundur. Demand of Dowry can be taken into consideration only at the place where the demand was made." It was further pointed out that, according to the complaint, the daughter of the complainant was harassed at Jullundur and payment was made at Jullundur and it was not the case of the complainant that the demand was ever made at Delhi by any of the accused persons. The order of the trial court was set aside by the Addl.. Sessions Judge in revision on the ground that the allegation contained in para (4) of the complaint "spell out the demand raised of cash, jewellery and other articles which were made on the complainant i.e. the father of the girl at or before the marriage." It was, therefore, held the this demand was in "consideration" of marriage within the meaning of Section 2 of the Act and "since demand was made on the complainant i.e. the present petitioner at Delhi, where the marriage was performed", Courts Delhi had the necessary jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. It was fur ther held that the last payment of Rs. 10000.00 was communicated to the complainant at Delhi and for that reason also, Delhi Courts had the necessary jurisdiction.

(3.) According to the petitioners, neither the complaint nor the preliminary evidence of the wife and her fattier disclose any offence punishable under Section 3 of the Act, much less the commission of any such offence within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court and that the dismissal of the complaint by the trial court was eminently justified, both on the court of jurisdiction, and on the merits. It: was further urged on behalf of the petitioners that, on the averments in the complaint, the various causes of action, if any, arose in Jullundur, where the demands were allegedly made from time to time and were said to have been satisfied. It was further urged that the post-marital demands would be outside the mischief of the expression "dowry", as defined in Section 2 of the Act, and could, if at all, attract the penal provision of Section 4, a complaint of which is not maintainable without the prior sanction of the State Government and there is neither a complaint of that offence nor were the petitioners summoned in relation thereto. According to the petitioners, a frivolous complaint was filed as acounterblast to the matrimonial proceedings filed by the husband in Jullundur, with a view to put undue pressure on the husband. On the other hand, it was urged on behalf of the complainant that the allegations, inter alia, in para (4) of the complaint contain a specific allegation of demand of dowry at the time of marriage besides a similar demand on other occasions and that this averment in the complaint clearly made out a case of an offence under Section 3 of the Act, irrespective of the manner in which the expression "dowry" as defined in Section 2, was interpreted. A strong pleas was made on behalf of the wife that, having regard to the prevalence of the evil of dowry and the frequency with which newly married girls were driven in desperation, on account of the exhorbirant demands of the husband and the in-laws, to the extreme step of suicide by self-immolation, and the cruel treatment being meted out to the young and innocent victims of bride burning, the expression "dowry" should be liberally construed so as to bring within its mischief various demands made on the family of the wife, not only before and at the time of the marriage but even subsequent thereto, as such demands are invariably conceded to save the marriage from being irretrievably broken, and to make married life tolerably pleasant. It was urged that the expression "consideration" used in Section 2 in defining the expression "dowry" would be wide enough to cover such post-marital demands as they have relation to the matrimonial relationship and are closely connected with it.