(1.) THIS revision petition is directed against order dated 10th April, 1981, of a subordinate judge holding that the civil Court has jurisdiction to try the suit and also that the same is not liable to be dismissed as the declaration prayed for can be granted even in the absence of any prayer for a consequential relief.
(2.) THE facts giving rise to the present revision petition succinctly are that the respondent (plaintiff) was employed as a Daftri with the petitioner, viz. , Bank of Maharashtra. He was prosecuted for an offence under Ss. 110/112/117 of the Bombay Police Act as extended to the Union Territory of Delhi and he was convicted of the same on 30th June, 1977, on his plea of guilty. A fine of Rs. 20 was imposed on him and in default of payment of fine he was sentenced to simple imprisonment for three days by the Court of a Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi. He filed a revision petition against his conviction and sentence which was partly allowed by Shri D. R. Khanna, Additional Sessions Judge, as his Lordship then was, vide order dated 15th November, 1977. He was given the benefit of Probation of Offenders' Act, 1958, and was simply admonished under S. 3 of the said Act. In the meanwhile, the respondent was suspended on 29th June, 1977, consequent upon his arrest by the police in the aforesaid case and he was eventually dismissed from the service of the petitioner-Bank, vide memorandum dated 6th July, 1977, under the provisions of clause 19. 3 (b) of the first Bipartite Settlement which had been arrived at between the managements of certain banking companies including the petitioner-Bank and their workmen who were represented by the All India Bank Employees Association and All India Bank Employees Federation on 19th October, 1966. Feeling aggrieved by the order of dismissal, respondent filed an appeal to the Chairman of the petitioner-Bank but of no avail. Thereupon the respondent instituted a suit for declaration that the aforesaid order of his dismissal from service was void and inoperative on the grounds enumerated in the plaint, one such ground being that his conviction for the aforesaid offence did not involve any moral turpitude and as such clause 19. 2 of the Bipartite Settlement could not be invoked to dismiss him.
(3.) THE suit was resisted by the petitioner-defendant, inter alia, the ground that the civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the same and it being an industrial dispute, the plaintiff could seek redress only from a Labour Court under the Industrial Disputes Act (for short, the Act ). It was further contended that the plaintiff had not prayed for any consequential relief and as such the suit for mere declaration did not lie in view of the prohibition contained in the proviso to S. 34 of the Specific Relief Act.