(1.) The only question that this appeal under Section 110 (d) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter called "the Act") raises is as to the quantum of compensation to which the appellant is entitled on account of general damages as a result of of the left arm as a result of accident and involves a difficult as indeed a painful exercise as to the valuation in monetary terms of pain, loss of happiness and diminution of earning capacity in cases of accident. (After narrating facts in paras 2 to 4 that appellant a student was seriously injured by bus of Respondent 2 & 3 and filed claim for Rs. 75,000.00 and Tribunal granted him only Rs. 10,835, the judgement proceeds)
(2.) Learned counsel for the appellant justified the enhancement of compensation on account of general damages on the ground that having regard to the shock, physical pain, loss of studies and adverse affect on future prospects and on the earning capacity of the appellant on account of amputation of the left arm and the psychological impact of it on the future happiness and enjoyment of life of the appellant, the compensation awarded on account of general damages by the Tribunal was atrociously low. Learned counsel further contended that the Tribunal had ignored the serious handicap from which the appellant would suffer in the rest of his life as a result of the loss of the left arm. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents sought to justify the quantification of general damages by the Tribunal and particularly laid stress on the principle laid down by various courts to regulate the interference in appeal in the Award of compensation by the Tribunal and contended that inasmuch as the general damages awarded in the present case were consistent with the circumstances of the case it could not be said to be so low as to justify in terference in appeal.
(3.) A review of the works of prominent authors on the law relating to damages and of the course of judicial decisions leads one to an irresistable conclusion that the task of ascertaining the quantum of general damages is a difficult and perplexing one, primarily because there is no exact or uniform rule for measuring the value, either of the human life or of any particular limb, and the assessment of damages for the loss of one or the other could not be arrived at by any precise mathematical calculation. A man who is physically injured in an accident ordinarily suffers more than a mere pecuniary loss. He may, for example, lose function of apart of his body; he may be permanently or temporarily, disfigured, he may experience pain, suffering and agony ; his enjoyment of life may be impaired as a result of the accident and he may be totally or partially, whether permanently or temporarily, disabled and, above ali, the loss of any part of the body may generally have an adverse psychological effect on his entire future and happiness. The task of evaluating these consequences of an accident is a very complex one for how does one go about fixing in terms of money or laying down a tariff, as it were, for, any of the aforesaid consequences of an accident. There is no doubt lhat life is a valuable asset and so are the various parts of the human body but the task of putting a value on any part of the body or to determine the extent of loss of happiness or capacity to work presents a difficult and a painful problem. However, difficult the problem of compensation for pecuniary losses may be, the basis of assessment have always been clear that award of the Tribunal seeks to put the injured, in the economic position, he would have in but for the accident. The compensation on this restitutionery basis is, however, impossible in the case of non-pecuniary losses because it is not possible to get an order for the defendant to re-deliver the plaintiff the leg or an eye which he has lost nor it is possible for a court to adopt a formula by which mental pain, agony and anguish, that is suffered by the victim, could be obliterated. Similarly the loss of happiness or partial or total earning capacity could not be supplied nor could days be added to a life which has been irretrievably shortened. Restitution in integrum in its ordinary meaning would be impossible in such a case. Courts have, therefore, in general confined their attention to the award of what may appear to the court to be fair and reasonable compensation or what in the circumstances appeared to it to be just.