PREM SHEEL MALHAN Vs. R P CHAWLA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) [Petitioner bought suit property on 22.12.61. It was in the occupation of 4 respondents and one Gurdas Ram as tenants. He sued the tenants U/S 14 (1) (e) claiming requirement for his family members of 11. Shri P.K. Bahri, ARC, allowed petition against Gurdas but dismissed same against Abbi and Chawla holding that need for father, brother and sister was not bona fide. Similarly Sh. K.B. Andley. ARC, dismissed petitions against Katyal and Chand Kaur. 5 appeals were taken to Tribunal which were dismissed. Landlord alone filed appeals in High Court. Katyal gave possession during pendency of appeal.] SAO 223/72, 225/72 & 226/72 were adjudged thus :- SAO 223 of 1972. The respondents to this appeal are the legal representatives of the original tenant Om Parkash Chawla. Even before the Tribunal, Om Parkash Chawla had died, so his legal representatives had been brought on record by the order of Tribunal dated 23rd of July, 1970. It was so urged by Shri Bhatia, the counsel for the respondent, that the appeal against Om Parkash Chawla was barred by time before the Rent Control Tribunal and, therefore, the present appeal by the appellant automatically is not maintainable It appears that the attorney of the appellant filed one application for obtaining certified copies in all the three cases, namely, Abbi, Om Parkash Chawla and Gurdas Ram. However, on 19th September, 1970 he was told that only one copy can be supplied on one application and he immediately filed two other applications for obtaining the certified copies of the order relating to the case of Om Parkash as well as of Gurdas Ram. The applications for copy were, however, returned to him on 13th February, 1970 on the ground that the file has been sent to the Rent Control Tribunal. He on 16th February, 1970 (14th and 15th being holidays) filed an application for obtaining a certified copy before the Rent Control Tribunal and filed them on 11th March, 1970 i.e. the day the certified copies were made available to him. On these facts the Tribunal has taken the view, and in my view rightly, that the delay in filing the certified copy was due to the fact that the appellant-landlord under a bonafide mistake filed one application for obtaining a certified copy. There is thus sufficient cause for condoning the delay. The Tribunal has exercised its discretion in condoning the delay in filing the appeal against Chawla and I see nothing illegal or capricious in the exercise of that discretion. I would, therefore, bold that the appeal before the Tribunal was filed in time.

(2.) The next question is whether a valid notice terminating the tenancy of Om Parkash Chawla was issued to him. AW 3/1 dated 1st December, 1967 is the notice sent to Om Parkash whereby his tenancy was terminated by the end of December 1967. Actually a reply to the above AW 3/5 dated 28th December, 1967 was sent by Chawla's counsel. Notice is thus valid and proper. I would, therefore, agree with the Rent Control Tribunal that the tenancy of Om Parkash Chawla was duly terminated. It was on the basis of this finding of the Rent Control Tribunal that the tenancy of Chawla had been validly terminated that Shri Mehra made his further argument that in the present case it was not necessary even to consider whether the landlord required these premises bonafide, or not because the legal representative of Om Parkash Chawla could not in any case resist the eviction application on the ground that O. P. Chawla was a statutory tenant and had only personal right to remain in possession and no rights accrue to his legal representatives as they were incapable of inheriting any estate and relied on Jagdish Chander Chatterjee and ors. V. Sh. Sri Kishan of 1972 Rent Control Report 675. In that case the ejectment application brought by the landlord on the ground that he required the house bonafide was allowed by the Munsif who decreed the suit for ejectment. The tenants' appeal was, however, allowed by the District Judge who held that the landlord did not require the premises reasonably and bonafide and dismissed the suit for eviction. The landlord filed appeal before the High Court. The tenant having died in the mean while, his legal representative was brought on record. The High Court came to the conclusion that it was not necessary to go into the question of bonafide reasonable necessity of the landlord as that was only protection provided to the statutory tenant personally under the Act and as the tenancy was duly terminated by notice and there was no other bar to the passing of decree in favour of the landlord, the order of the District Judge was set aside and the decree of the Munsif was restored.

(3.) Agreeing with the High Court it was observed by the Supreme Court :-