BLUE STAR LIMITED Vs. LABOUR COURT

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The only question that this Letters Patent Appeal raises is as to whether areference under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, hereinafter celled "the Act" to the Labour Court constituted for the Union Territory of Delhi and then "presided over by Shri Desh Deepak was invalid merely because the appointment of Shri Desh Deepak to the said Labour Court in the absence on leave of Shri R. K. Baweja, who was presiding over it, was eventually struck down by this Court on the ground that there was no "vacancy" in which Shri Desh Deepak could be appointed.

(2.) The facts are not in dispute and may be briefly stated. There are at present and were, during the material period, ' four Labour Courts for the Union Territory of Delhi constituted under Section 7(1) of the Act, one of which was presided over by Shri R. K. Baweja. On the absence of Shri Baweja on leave from November 26, 1968 to January 1, 1969, the Lt. Governor appointed Shri Desh Deepak as the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court constituted for the Union Territory of Delhi "for the period from 26-11-1969 to 1-1-1969 vice Shri R. K. Baweja who has proceeded on leave". The appointment of Shri Desh Deepak was made on the assumption that the temporary absence on leave of Shri Baweja constituted a "vacancy" for the office of the Presiding Officer of that Court within the meaning of Section 8 of the Act. On the. said appointment being challenged by a petition in this Court in this case of Pedders Lloyd Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Lt Governor, Delhi through Under Secretary (Labour) Delhi and others. AIR 1970 Delhi 60(1), the same was quashed on the ground that by his temporary absence on leave. Shri Baweja had not demited his office and there being, therefore, no "vacancy" within the meaning of Section 8 of the Act, the appomtment of Shri Desh Deepak was illegal and that the appropriate authority could, if it wanted, constitute an Additional Labour Court under Section 9 of the Act with Shri Desh Deepak as it's Presiding Officer. It, however, appears that during the period Shri Desh Deepak. purported to act as Presiding Officer of the said Labour Court, some references under section 10(1) of the Act, including the one in the prevent case were made "to the Labour Court constituted for the Union Territory of Delhi and at present presided over by Shri Desh Deepak". When Shri Baweja assumed as Presiding Officer of the said Court and purported to proceed with the reference, the jurisdiction of Shri Baweja to deal with the reference was challenged, on the ground that a reference of the matter to the Labour Court "presided over by Shri Desh Deepak" could not empower the Labour Court presided over by Shri Baweja to take seizen of the matter. The objection prevailed and by an Award of February 26, 1973, the Labour Court held that it had no jurisdiction to adjudicate on the dispute on 'the ground that the reference had been made to a Labour Court presided over by Shri Desh Deepa,k and that such a reference could be heard only by Shri Desh Deepak, and not by any other Presiding Officer of the Labour Court. It was further held that if the appointment of the aforesaid Presiding Officer to the Labour Court had' been held to be invalid, the reference did not survive. The aforesaid Award was challenged by the workman concerned in a petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India and Deshpande J., who heard the matter, quashed the aforesaid Award and held that, having regard to the scheme of the Act, the reference was to a Labour Court and not a Presiding Officer; that the reference was to a Labour Court then presided over by Shri Desh Deepak; that Shri Desh Deepak according to his appointment temporarily presided over the Labour Court during the absence on leave of Shri R. K. Baweja, that the subsequent annulment of the order of appointment of Shri Desh Deepak as the Presiding Officer of the said Labour Court, did not invalidate the reference; that the order of reference read with the notification regarding the appointment of Shri Desh Deepak to the Labour Court left no doubt as to the identity of the Labour Court; and that the Labour Court presided over by Shri R. K. Baweja was, therefore, competent to deal, with the reference. It is this judgment which is sought to be assailed in the present Letters Patent Appeal.

(3.) Shri Veda Vyasa learned counsel for the appellant, even while conceding that the appointment of Shri Desh Deepak as a Presiding Officer in the purported vacancy caused by the absence on leave of Shri Baweja, which was eventually struck down by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Fedders Lloyd Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. (supra) did not amount to the constitution of a fresh Labour (1) Court for the Union Territory of Delhi, and that when a dispute was referred to a Labour Court undcr Section 10 of the Act the reference was to the Court and not to the Presiding Officer mentioned therein, contended that the reference in the present case having been made "to the Labour Court constituted for the Union Territory of Delhi and at present presided over by Shri Desh Deepak", it could" be dealt with only by the Labour Court which was presided over by Shri Desh Deepak and since the appointment of Shri Desh Deepak was eventually struck down by this Court, no valid order of reference survived. Learned counsel argued that even though the Court and its Presiding Officer were conceptually distinct under the scheme of Section 7 of the Act, there could be no Labour Court without a Presiding Officer and drew attention to Rule 5 of the Industrial Dispute (Central) Rules Rules, 1957, which provide that "the appointment of a Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal together with the name's of person constituting" the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall be notified in the official Gazette. Learned counsel further argued that inasmuch as there was no Labour Court in Delhi which could be said to have been presided over by Shri Desh Deepak including the Labour Court on which he purported to preside, the present Labour Court was not competent to deal with the reference.