SATYA PAL Vs. PARSANI DEVI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) By this secoud appeal under Section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter called ' the Act'), the appellant, an unsuccessful tenant, challenges anorder of the Rent Control Tribunal by which it has affirmed in appeal an order made by the Additional Rent Controller directing the eviction of the appellant from the premises in dispute under Section 14 (1) (e) of the Act on the ground that the premises in dispute were bona fide required by the respondent/landlady for her residence and that the respondent/ landlady had no other suitable accommodation available for the purpose.

(2.) The appellant has been in occupation of the premises in dispute being a portion of the ground floor of the property, consisting of two rooms, a verandah, kitchen, bath, court-yard and a common laterine. The landlady has been in occupation of a part of the first floor of the property and while it is not disputed that the premises in the occupation of the landlady on the first floor is otherwise sufficient for her requirements, the eviction of the tenant was sought on the ground that on account of old age and disease of the legs and joints, the landlady found it painful and difficult to climb the stairs and the premises in question were required by her bona fide for her residence us there was no suitable accommodation available to her for the purposes on the ground floor. The Additional Rent Controller returned a finding that the premises were bonafide required by the landlady for her residence as on account of old age and diseae of the limbs and legs, the landlady found it difficult and painful to climb the stairs and that the need of the landlady was both genuine and reasonable. The pleas urged on behalf of the appellant that the ground on which the eviction was sought was merely a ruse to enhance the rent; that the landlady was healthy and fit enough to climb the stairs and that the landlady was not owner of the property in dispute were dispelled. In appeal, the order oFihe Additional Rent Controller was upl-eld &nd\ the further contention urged on behalf of the appellant that, during the pendency of the proceedings, the landlady had obtained vacant possession of two different portions of the ground floor one consisting of a room. verandah infront, couriyard, common bath and common laterine and the other of a room measuring 6' x 10' and that therefore. the need of the landlady had been satisfied and it could not besaid that no reasonably suitably residential accommodation was available for the landlady on the ground floor, was turned down.by the Rent Control Tribunal on the ground that the .additional accommodation made available to the landlady could not be considered reasonably suitable for her requirement because the said portions did not constitute a compact unit and the rooms were not adjacent to each other and there were other tenants living in the portion which could made it difficult for the landlady, who was old and ailing, to live comfortably.

(3.) On behalf of the respondent/landlady, a preliminary objection was raised as to the maintainability of the Second Appeal on the ground that the question whether the landlady bona fide required the premises in dispute and whether there was no other reasonable accommodation available to her were questions of fact and the Courts below having returned a concurrent finding on these questions against the tenant, it was not open to this Court under Section 39 (7) of the Act to consider the correctness of such a finding. This objection appears to me to be unsustainable because the question whether the premises are bona fide required by the landlady and as to whether the alternative residential accommodation available was suitable or not were not pure questions of fact but were mixed questions of law and fact and it was open to the High Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 39 (2) of the Act, to consider the correctness or otherwise of such a finding and the concdrrent finding of frct on these questions could not divest the High Court of its jurisdiction under the aforesaid provision. The preliminary objection is, therefore overruled.