MANEESH KUMAR Vs. COMMISSIONER OF POLICE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioner assails the order dated 12.02.2014 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi (for short, 'the Tribunal') in O.A. No. 4248/2012, as well as the order of termination dated03.01.2012 and the order dated 17.08.2012 rejecting the petitioner's representation, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

(2.) THE petitioner had been appointed in the Delhi Police as a Constable (Executive) on 11.01.2010. After about a year and a half, on 05.06.2011, a first information report (FIR No. 190/2011) was registered at Police Station, Sadar Rohtak (Haryana) , under Section 392 IPC read with Sections 25 and 54 of the Arms Act, in connection with the snatching of money of a truck driver. The FIR was against unnamed persons. The petitioner was implicated in the said case; was arrested and lodged in judicial custody. The petitioner was placed under deemed suspension by the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Rashtrapati Bhawan, New Delhi, vide order dated22.06.2011 consequent upon his arrest. The petitioner was granted bail by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, on 21.05.2012. The petitioner and the other accused were not identified by the prosecution witnesses. On the basis of the evidence recorded by the trial court, the petitioner was acquitted. There was yet another FIR being case FIR No. 173 dated 15.05.2011 under Sections 392 IPC read with Sections 25/54/59 of the Arms Act, PS Sadar Rohtak, in relation to which the petitioner was arrested on 19.06.2011.

(3.) THE petitioner made a representation on 06.06.2012, which too was rejected by the respondents vide order dated 17.08.2012. Consequently, the petitioner preferred the original application before the Tribunal. The submission of petitioner before the Tribunal, it appears from the impugned order, was that the termination order had been passed merely on the basis of conjectures and surmises on the presumption that the petitioner was involved in the commission of the alleged crimes. The respondent had merely relied on the contents of the two FIRs to conclude that the petitioner was a desperate character.