STATE BANK OF INDIA Vs. DAMYANTI RANI CHADHA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This second appeal has been brought against judgment of the Rent Control Tribunal dated January 16, 1985, by which he had dismissed the appeal of the appellant against order of the Additional Rent Controller dated August 3, 1984, by which ground of eviction covered by Clause (k) of the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act was upheld.

(2.) The admitted facts of the case are that the land underneath the demised premises was given on perpetual lease by the Land & Development Office of the Union of India to Shri Maharaj Kishan vide lease deed, copy of which is Ex. AW3/ I and this was a lease for 99 years which came into effect from April 1, 1951. Smt.Damyanti Rani Chadha-appellant had inherited the leasehold rights from her husband-Sh.Maharaj Kishan on the basis of the Will which has been duly probated. The premises in question were admittedly let out to the State Bank of India for establishing its commercial branch in the demised premises. Under Clause (k) the ground of eviction becomes available to the landlord in case the premises are used in any manner contrary to the condition imposed on the landlord by the Government or any other authority mentioned therein while giving a lease of the land on which the premises are situated and notwithstanding any previous notice the said misuser is not stopped.

(3.) Under Clause 1 (vii) of the lease-deed the land could not be used but for constructing a house without the previous consent in writing of the officer appointed by the lessor in this behalf. It is asserted by the landlady that the house which had been constructed on the land could be used only for residential purposes according to the terms of the lease and thus, as the appellant had not stopped the commercial user despite a notice being served, so the ground of eviction has become available to the landlady. It is the interpretation of this particular clause and the other terms of the lease deed which would decide the fate of this appeal inasmuch as the learned Counsel for the appellant has vehemently argued that the moment a house had been constructed the terms of the lease stood complied with and reading of the whole of the lease does not show that any user of that house in any manner would lead to any breach of any term of the lease-deed and thus, he has argued that the ingredients of Clause (k) mentioned above are not proved in this case. Hence, the ground of eviction was not available to the landlady atall. I may mention that this point has not been urged before the lower authorities and has been taken for the first time before this Court in arguments. The interpretation of document is a question of law. In my view, such a question of law can be raised even for the first time in the second appeal.