BRIJPAL SINGH Vs. MISRO DEVI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The respondent/landlady filed a petition for eviction of the petitioner from the premises in question invoking provisions of Section 14-D of the Delhi Rent Control Act(hereinafter called the Act). The case of the respondent was that she was a widow and the premises let out by her were required by her for her own residence. By the impugned order dated 5th September, 1992 the Additional Rent Controller allowed the petition and passed an order of eviction against the petitioner under Section 14-D of the Act. The petitioner has approached this Court by invoking the provisions of Section 25-B (8) of the Act by filing this revision petition.

(2.) This petition is contested on behalf of the respondent. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. Section 25-B (8) of the Act provides that the High Court may, for the purpose of satisfying itself that an order made by the Controller under this section is according to law, call for the records of the case and pass such order in respect thereto as it thinks fit.

(3.) In the case ofHelper Girdharbhai v. Saiyed Mohmad Mirasaheb Kadra and others reported as AIR 1987 SC 1782, the Supreme Court dealt with the question of revisional powers of the High Court under Section 29(2) of the Bombay Rent Control Act. Section 29(2) of the Bombay Rent Control Act is pari materia with Section 25-B (8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. It was observed by the Supreme Court as under:- "We must take note of a decision in the case of Kasturbhai Ramchand Panchal and Brothers v. Firm of Mohanlal Nathubhai, AIR 1969 Guj 110 upon which the High Court had placed great reliance in the judgment under appeal. There the learned Judge relying on S.29(2) of the said Act held that the revisional power with which the High Court was vested under S. 29(2) was not merely in the nature of jurisdictional control. It extended to corrections of all errors which would make the decision contrary to law. The legislature, the learned Judge felt, further empowered High Court in its revisional jurisdiction to pass such order with respect thereto as it thought fit. The power according to the learned Judge was of the widest amplitude to pass such orders as the Court thought fit in order to complete justice. He dealt with the human problem under Section 13(2) of Bombay Rent Act considering the relative hardships of the landlord and the tenant and to arrive at a just solution he was of the opinion that the court should have such wide field. The jurisdiction of the High Court is to correct all errors of law going to the root of the decision which would, in such cases, include even perverse findings of facts, preverse in the sense that no reasonable person, acting judicially and properly instructed in the relevant law could arrive at such a finding on the evidence on the record. In this view in our opinion the ambit of the power was expressed in rather wide amplitude. As we read the power, the High Court must ensure that the principles of law have been correctly borne in mind. Secondly, the facts have been properly appreciated and a decision arrived at taking all material and relevant facts in mind. It must be such a decision which no reasonable man could have arrived at. Lastly, such a decision does not lead to a miscarriage of justice. We must, however, guard ourselves against permitting in the guise of revision substitution of one view where two views are possible and the Court of Small Causes has taken a particular view. If a possible view has been taken, the High Court would be exceeding its jurisdiction to substitute its own view with that of the courts below because it considers it to be a better view. The fact that the High Court would have taken a different view is wholly irrelevant. Judged by that standard, we are of the opinion that the High Court in this case had exceeded its jurisdiction."