(1.) The question arising for consideration in this appeal u/s 10 of the Letter Patent is whether the loss of earning capacity of the appellant Mohd. Yunus aged 15 years at the time of accident resulting in his permanent disablement, has been correctly determined in the impugned judgment. The case of the appellant was that he was working as a tailor. The facts found by the MAC Tribunal and affirmed by the learned Single Judge are that Mohd. Yunus suffered an injury to his left hand and the wrist in an accident on 19.2.65. The accident was due to rash and negligent driving of Shri Laxmi Chand driver of bus No. DLP 586 owned by the DTU of the Mun. Corp. of Delhi.
(2.) The Tribunal accepted the testimony of Dr. R.K. Busaj (PW 7) who stated "the injured had big Lacerated wound from left elbow torsel aspect to knuckles" when brought to the casualty department of hospital. The doctor found "complete degloving of skin, over distal third of forearm and hand. All tendons over wrist and hand and distal third of forearm were exposed". It appears that in spite of six operations and plastic surgery carried out, Mohd. Yunus's hand could not be cured; the injury resulted in permanent disbility of the wrist joint and fingers. Dr. Busaj (PW 7) was corroborated by Dr. M.S. Rawat (PW 5) and Dr. Amir Chand Narula (PW 8) who categorically affirmed that Mohd. Yunus suffered permanent disability of his left hand because of the injury. Dr. Narula further opined that the injured has been permanently incapacitated to work as a tailor.
(3.) The learned Tribunal, however, found that the evidence produced by the petitioner that he was being paid Rs. 80 p.m. as a tailor, was not satisfactory as no documents had been produced by his employer Rattan Lal in support of the contention that he was being paid that amount. The fact that the appellant was a tailor was not challend in his or his father's cross-exam. In the appellant's cross-exam, the attempt was to show that he contributed to the accident. In his father's cross-exam, it was brought out that the medical treatment given to the appellant was free.