(1.) This second appeal was originally filed by the tenant Jagdish Chander against the order of the Rent Control tribunal dated 12th January, 1971. The Tribunal found that the tenancy was terminated by a notice to quit and the subsequent acceptance of rent from the tenant by the landlord did not amount to a waiver of the said notice in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Ganga Dutt Murarka v. Kartika Chandra Das. It further held that the landlord was entitled^ to the possession of the premises from the tenant because he needed them bona fide for his own occupation as a residence within the meaning of clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter called the Act). I agree with both these findings.
(2.) During the pendency of the appeal, the tenant died. On an application made by the legal representatives of the tenant, the Deputy Registrar directed there names to besubstituted in place of the deceased appellant. This order was passed by the Deputy Registrar without notice to the respondent and was expressly made "subject to all just exceptions". The respondent thereupon made an application that the appeal has become infructuous on the death of the tenant and is liable to be dismissed. The deceased tenant was only a statutory tenant inasmuch as the tenancy had been validly determined by the landlord by a notice to quit. According to the Supreme Court decision in Anand Niwus (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Anandji Kalyanji Pedhi, at 908-909 :-
(3.) Under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, a person against whom an Order for eviction is passed ceases to be atenant. The deceased was, therefore, only entitled to the protection of the Act in his personal capacity alone. He could not pass this protection to his assignees or legal representatives. The legal representatives of the deceased are not, therefore, entitled to the protection of section 14 of the Act. The decision in Anand Niwas case was followed by the Supreme Court again in J. C.Chatteriee v. Shri Sri Kishan Tandon. In that case, the Second appeal had been filed by the landlord and the tenant died during the pendency of the said appeal. The legal representatives were brought on record. In paragraph 11, the Supreme Court observed that they were entitled to make any defence appropriate to their character as legal representatives. Inasmuch as the tenancy was not inherited by them and since they could not even inherit the statutory protection enjoyed by the deceased, they could not resist the claim of the landlord for possession except on a ground which may be peculiar to themselves. In the present case, the legal representatives of the deceased appellant have not urged any ground peculiar to themselves. According to the Supreme Court decision cited above, they are not entitled to the protection of section 14 of the Delhi Kent Control Act, 1958. It follows, therefore, that the landlord is entitled to evict them under clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14 inasmuch as the legal representatives cannot make any defence against the said claim of the landlord. In fact, the landlord can simply evict them on the sole ground that the tenancy of the deceased having been terminated, they have no right to resist the claim of the landlord for posesssion. However, as the original claim of the landlord against the deceased tenant was made under clause (e) of the proviso to Sub-section (1) of section 14 and in view of the death of the tenant which is already a calamity befalling the legal representatives, I pass the following order in this appeal.