JAINTENDRA KUMAR AGGARWAL Vs. LAKSHMI KANT MUKT

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The question referred to the full bench for decision is whether the Rent Control Tribunal while dealing with an application under sub-section (4) of section 38 of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter called "the Act") is a "Court" for purposes of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and a "Civil Court" within the meaning of section 476 of the said Code.

(2.) Jaintendra Kumar, appellant filed an application for eviction against the respondent Lakshmi Kant Mukt under section 14 of the Act. While the application was pending, the respondent applied under section 38(4) for transfer of the case (jaintendra Kumar Aggarwal v. Lakshmi Kant Mukt) from Shri D. C. Aggarwal, Controller, Delhi before whom the application was pending to some other Additional Controller for trial. In paragraphs (5) and (7) of the transfer application and the affidavit filed in support of it he made certain allegations casting aspersions on Shri D. C. Aggarwal. The Tribunal while deciding the application found that these allegations were absolutely false to the knowledge of the respondent, but acting on the view that the Additional Rent Controller did not constitute either a Civil Court or a Criminal Court or a Revenue Court, declined by order dated December 17, 1968 the appellant's oral request lor prosecuting the respondent for committing perjury. The appellant, thereupon, on February 13, 1969 filed an application under section 476 read with section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and prayed that a complaint under section 193 of the Indian Penal Code be filed against the respondent. The Tribunal rejected this application also. It held that while dealing with application under sub-section (4) of section 38, the Tribunal was not a Civil Court. Aggrieved from this order, the appellant filed an appeal in this Court under section 476B of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The learned single Judge, in view of the importance of the question involved, referred the matter to a larger bench. The Division Bench in turn directed it to be placed before a still larger bench and that is how this appeal is now before us.

(3.) Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure deals with proccedings in prosecution for contempts of lawful authority of public servants. Provisions relevant for the purpose of the controversy before us are clause (b) of sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) of this section. They are in the following terms:--