G R LUTHRA Vs. ADMINISTRATOR OF DELHI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The only question involved in this case was whether a person holding the post of an Additional District and Sessions Judge in temporary or substantive capacity, was a member of the cadre of the higher judicial service of District & Sessions Judges. According to the petitioner, such a person becomes a member of that cadre only on confirmation. It was on this ground that he claimed seniority over respondents Nos. 2 to 4. The respondents contested this claim.

(2.) The seniority has to be determined in accordance with Rule 6(3) of the Delhi Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1960, wherein occurs the word "cadre". This word is not defined in the said Rules; nor is it defined in the Punjab Superior Judicial Service Rules, 1963, which, as amended, are applicable to the State of Haryana as well. In order to interpret the word "cadre", we examined Fundamental Rules in force from January 1, 1922 together with various Government decisions and orders given in December 1936, which have remained in the field since then. We also referred to the Punjab Civil Service Rules, which are also in the same terms. We found that the word "cadre" has all along been construed as including within its fold permanent as well as temporary posts. We also noticed that the term "cadre" was interpreted by the Punjab and Haryana High Court as including both permanent and temporary posts (see Jag Raj v. State of Punjab, 1969 (3) SLR 622 (FB), and Lajpat Rai Mago v. Governor of Haryana and others, AIR 1972 Punjab and Haryana 133). We had, therefore, rejected the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that the word "Cadre" includes permanent posts only. In doing so, we applied the well settled principles of interpretation, which had found favour with the Supreme Court in State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley Company Limited, AIR 1958 SC 560 (para 33) that the legislature must be taken to have intended that words of legal import, which acquire a definite and precise sense, should be understood in that sense. The application of the principle settled by the Supreme Court in interpreting the word "cadre", by our adhering to and adopting the precise connotation, it has come to possess, therefore, cannot be said to raise a substantial question of law (see Sir Chunilal v. Mehta and Sons Limited, v. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Limited, AIR 1962 SC 1314) .

(3.) Mr. R. L. Aggarwal contended that this case involved matters of great public and private importance. The question involved was about the fixation of seniority of candidates appointed at the initial constitution of Delhi Higher Judicial Service, which took place on May 17, 1971. There would not arise another occasion for "initial constitution" of the service. The question, therefore, is confined to the case of the petitioner alone and cannot be said to be a question of general or public importance. Mr. R. L. Aggarwal then urged that the question raised was of great private importance, as the petitioner's future service career depended upon the final outcome of this case. But, as has always been held, it should be a question of private importance to both parties to the litigation (see Banarsi Pershad v. Kashi Krishan Narain (1900) 28 IA ll, B. Raja Rajeswara Setha v. Tiruneela Kantam Setvui, AIR 1923 Madras 232, Batala Engineering Co. Limited v. Custodian of Evacuee Property, AIR 1951 Punjab 412, and the Indian Trade and General Insurance Company Limited v. Raj Mal Pahar Chand and another, AIR 1956 Punjab 228).