ABNASH KAUR Vs. LORD KRISHNA SUGAR MILLS LIMITED

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This order will dispose of three separate applications, SCAs 266, 267 and 268 of 1972, filed by Smt. Abnash Kaur. herein referred to as 'the petitioner', under Article 133 of the Constitution of India, for the grant of a certificate of fitness for appeal to the Supreme Court, against our judgment dated May 11th, 1972, where by we disposed of three Company Appeals Nos. 8, 10 and II of 1971. All the three appeals were directed against the judgment dated May 27, 1971 of the learned Company Judge, refusing the petitioner's prayer in her application foi winding up of the company. Lord Krishna Sugar Mills.

(2.) Mr.G.C.Mittal. appearing on behalf of the petitioner, submitted that she was entitled as a matter of right to the grant of a certificate of. fitness as the amount or value of the subject matter in dispute in the court of first instance and still in dispute on appeal was and is not less than Rs 20.000.00and the judgment involved directly or indirectly claim or question respecting property of the like amount or value : ana especially as our judgment was said to have not affirmed all the material decision) and the operative pan of the judgment of the learned Company Judge. The learned counsel urged that the application for the grantof the certificate having been filed before the coming into force of the Constitution (Thirtieth Amendment) Act, 1972, herein called "the Amendment Act', which came into force on February 27, 1973, the petitioner's application was governed by Article 133 of the Constitution. as it stood before the date.

(3.) The contention of the learned counsel is erroneous. Sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Amendment Act creates an absolute bar to an appeal to the Supreme Court unless the appeal satisfies the provision of clause (1) of Article 133 of the Constitution as amended by the Amendment Act. There are, however, two exceptions provided by suo- section (1) of section 3 of the Amendment Act, viz. (a) appeal. which immediately before the commencement of the Amendment Act was pending before the Supreme Court, and (b) an appeal preferred after the commencement of the Amendment Act by virtue of a certificate given before the commencement of the Amendment Act under sub-clause (a) or (b) or (c) of clause (1) of Article 133. The present case is not covered by any of the aforesaid two exceptions. Neither the appeal is pending nor has the certificate applied for been given before the commencement of the Amendment Act. The mere filing of the application for the grant of such a certificate before the commencement of the Amendment Act is of no avail. The grant of certificate of fitness shall depend upon the appeal satisfying the provisions of Article 133(1) as amended.