(1.) The respondent herein was convicted by the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Hauz Kazi, Delhi for an offence under section 8 of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 150.00 or in default to under go 1 months rigorous imprisonment. The respondent preferred an appeal in the Court of Session against his conviction and the sentence passed against him and the learned Additional Sessions Judge, who heard the appeal, set aside the conviction of the respondent and the sentence passed against him and allowed the appeal. Against this judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge acquitting the respondent, the State has preferred the present appeal.
(2.) It is not necessary to state the facts of this case, because the learned Additional Sessions Judge acquitted the respondent only on one ground, namely, that the investigation of the case by the police was illegal inasmuch as the police officer who investigated into this offence was not a special police officer appointed by the State Government under section 13 of the Act. The relevant portion of that section reads as follows :-
(3.) The learned Additional Sessions Judge has followed the decision of a Single Bench of the Punjab High Court in State v. Mehro, 1962 (1) Cr. L. J. 361. Before referring to the rule laid down in that case, it may be noticed that this decision was over-ruled by a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in State of Haryana v. Rugha (AIR 1970 Punjab & Haryana 502) The main question that arose for consideration in the case of State v. Mehro was whether the words "dealing with" in Section 13 (1) of the Act included the investigation of an offence under the Act. The learned Judge held that these words included the investigation of an offence under the Act and that only a special police officer appointed under section 13 of the Act was competent to investigate into an offence- under the Act and an investigation by a police officer who was not appointed as a special police officer under section 13 of the Act was illegal. To this extent, the view of the learned Judge is supported by the decision of the Supreme Court in Delhi Administration v. Ram Singh (AIR 1962 SC 63) in which the majority view was expressed in the following terms:-