SITARAM RAM Vs. JAI BABOO

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This revision has been referred for decision by a larger bench because of divergence of views expressed in the cases- Vas Dev v. Sohan Singh and others (1968) D.L.T. 492 and Inder Lal Sapra v. Brij Mohan (S.A.O. 300 of 1971) decided on May 24, 1972 on the question whether a judgment-debtor tenant.. during execution of the decree for eviction against him, on the ground of personal bona fide need of the landlord, can agitate the question that the need of the landlord had ceased to exist and, therefore, the decree was inexecutable.

(2.) In a suit for eviction filed by the respondent (hereafter called "the landlord") under the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act. 1952 (hereafter called "the 1952 Act") for eviction of the appellant (hereafter called "the tenant") on the ground that the premises were required by him bona fide, the trial court on December 21, 1955 granted a decree for eviction in his favour on the basis of a compromise. According to the compromise, the decree was executable only after February 15, 1957. After the decree, it appears that Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 came into force so that the landlord could not apply for execution without obtaining permission of the competent authority under the Slum Act. On June 4, 1969, the landlord obtained this permission and thereafter applied for execution of the decree. On September 16, 1970, the tenant filed objections under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure urging, amongst others, that the landlord had purchased another big property and he and his family was in occupation of it and his necessity had ceased to exist, and the decree was inexecutable. The landlord contested the objections. The executing court framed issues and recorded evidence. On July 14, 1972, the tenant filed an application under Order 6, rule 17 for permission to amend the objections by substituting paragraph 11 to say that the landlord had shifted into a premises which had seven rooms, a store and two latrines, two baths, kitchen and a 'barsati' and this accommodation with him was sufficient for his needs and his necessity had, therefore, ceased to exist. By order dated October 20, 1972, the executing court dismissed this application. Hence the revision leading to the present reference.

(3.) The learned executing court, in substance, held that the application for amendment was mala fide and also that the proposed amendment entailed leading of fresh evidence directed to displace the decree and the amendment, therefore, could not be allowed.