TCM LTD Vs. T P MURLIDHARAN AND ORS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The present petition is directed against an order of 24.05.2012 by the Appellate Authority for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (AAIFR), admitting the appeal filed by the first respondent (hereafter referred to as "Sh. Murlidharan").

(2.) It is argued that the AAIFR fell into error in entertaining the appeal of Sh. Murlidharan. Learned counsel emphasised that the past record established the statement of Sh. T.S. Sanil, who had preferred another appeal against the order of Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) dated 28.11.2008, which led a Division Bench of this Court to relegate the matter, i.e. of Sh. T.S. Sanil, to be decided on the merits, thereby precluding Sh. Murlidharan from filing the appeal. It was argued in this context that the statement of Sh. T.S. Sanil was categorical about the involvement and role of Sh. Murlidharan in preferring the latter's appeal on 26.11.2009. It was submitted that in these circumstances, the plea of Sh. Murlidharan, which had also to be viewed in the context of his reply (which in turn admitted to his assisting Sh. T.S. Sanil in the filing of this appeal) was absolutely clear and the appeal should not have been entertained. Learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of this Court Pasupati Fabrics Ltd. & Ors. v. Priyanka Overseas Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., 2006 86 DRJ 6 for the proposition that shareholders do not have any locus standi to agitate the matters before BIFR unless the DRS implicates or in any manner prejudices the shareholders. Learned counsel also relied upon the decision of the Bombay High Court in Northern Projects Ltd. v. Blue Coast Hotels and Resorts Ltd., 2009 148 CompCas 279, to say that past transactions before the holding by a shareowner cannot be called into question in legal proceedings.

(3.) Learned counsel for Sh. Murlidharan resisted the submissions of the petitioner and urged that the AAIFR acted within its jurisdiction in entertaining the appeal. It is contended that the words used in the statute section 25, - are specific, i.e. the limitation period would commence from the date the certified order is "issued to" the concerned party. Learned counsel stressed upon the submission that the statute in such instances has been construed strictly rather than liberally and the Court has previously held that notwithstanding the knowledge of the impugned order, the date that is determinative of the question of limitation is the date of the order itself.