BIKRAMJIT ARORA Vs. SOMA DEVI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The appellant had filed suit against the respondents on the allegations that he was a tenant of respondent No. 1 with regard to a stall situated at Sadar Bazaar, Delhi Cantonment, New Delhi at a monthly rent of Rs. 200/-. Alleging that the respondents were threatening to dispossess the appellant by force, the appellant filed a suit against the respondents for an injunction restraining the respondents from dispossessing the appellant otherwise than by due process of law. In the suit the stand taken by respondent No. 1 was that the appellant was not her tenant; that the stall in question was allotted to her by Delhi Cantonment Board on licence basis and as she was a widow, she had only permitted the appellant to run the said stall without creating any right in his favour. Though, in certain other proceedings, respondent No. 1 had admitted appellant to be her tenant and had undertaken not to dispossess him forcibly, however, in these proceedings respondent No. 1 denied appellant to be her tenant. Along with the suit, an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2, CPC was also filed by the appellant for grant of an ad-interim injunction restraining the respondents from dispossessing the appellant by force or in any other manner otherwise than by due process of law.

(2.) By the impugned order, the learned Additional District Judge (Vacation Judge) dismissed the application of the appellant for the grant of ad-interim relief. It was observed by the Court that the stall had been allotted in favour of respondent No. 1 by respondent No. 2 and respondent No. 2 had now resolved to shift respondent No. 1 to some other place. It was observed by the Court that since there was no privity of contract between the appellant and respondent No. 2, the appellant cannot get any relief against the said respondent. The Court, therefore, by the impugned order dismissed the application of ad-interim injunction, aggrieved by which the appellant has filed the present appeal.

(3.) It is not denied by learned Counsel for the appellant that there is no privity of contract between the appellant and respondent No. 2. It is also not denied that the stall in question was allotted by respondent No. 2 in favour of respondent No. 1. The contention of learned Counsel for the appellant, however, is that since the appellant is in possession of the stall, he has a right to protect his possession even against respondent No. 2 and the appellant was thus entitled to the grant of an injunction restraining both the respondents from dispossessing him otherwise than by due process of law.