MANAGING DIRECTOR CWC Vs. MOR SINGH GOSAIN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Admit, It is submitted by learned Counsel for the appellant that the Trial Court file is not required for disposal of this appeal and I have, therefore, proceeded to decide this matter without the Trial Court record.

(2.) The plaintiff-respondent was working as a Chowkidar with the appellant- Corporation on permanent basis. Since the respondent was not promoted he filed Suit against the appellant for certain reliefs including the relief of mandatory injunction directing the appellant to promote him to a higher post and grant him seniority. The Trial Court by its judgment and decree dated 3rd May, 1999 dismissed the Suit on the ground that since the plaintiff had an equally efficacious remedy available to him under the Industrial Disputes Act, the Suit was not maintainable. Aggrieved by judgment and decree of the Trial Court the respondent filed an appeal before the District Judge. The learned Additional District Judge by the impugned Order allowed the appeal after holding that Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act only covers collective disputes of workmen and the present dispute regarding withholding of seniority, denial of promotion and increments was not covered by Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The First Appellate Court was, therefore, of the view that since it is not a dispute covered by Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act there was no bar to the filing of the Civil Suit by the respondent. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the matter was remanded to the Trial Court for decision in accordance with law. The judgment of the First Appellate Court remanding the case to the Trial Court after allowing the appeal has now been challenged by filing the present appeal.

(3.) The First Appellate Court in its judgment while holding that it was not an industrial dispute has placed reliance upon Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act. According to the First Appellate Court the industrial dispute covers collective disputes of workmen and the dispute regarding withholding of seniority, denial of promotion, increments, etc. are not covered by Section 2(k). This finding of the First Appellate Court, in my opinion, is not correct while an individual dispute regarding discharge, dismissal or termination of services of an individual worker it is also an industrial dispute within the meaning of Section 2(A) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the dispute of an individual workman regarding his seniority, promotion, etc. can also become an industrial dispute in case it is espoused either by the union of the employees or by substantial number of workmen of the establishment. It is therefore not correct to say that it is only a collective dispute which can be referred under the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act. However, the Order of the Trial Court in any case could not be sustained as the remedy provided to a workman to approach the Civil Court is in addition to the remedy provided under the Industrial Disputes Act. In case a suit is not barred under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure a party has a right to seek remedy in a Civil Court and he cannot be compelled to go to an exclusive Court established for the purpose. However, in case the remedy in a Civil Court is clearly barred by a particular statute, the suit in the Civil Court may in that case be barred and the party may have to seek recourse to the remedy provided under the Act. In the present case nothing has been shown to the Court that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide the suit was ousted by any provision of the Industrial Disputes Act. That being the position in my opinion the judgment and decree of the Trial Court could not be sustained. Matter has, therefore, been rightly remanded for decision in accordance with law. As the judgment and decree of the Trial Court cannot be sustained and the matter has been rightly remanded to the Trial Court for decision in accordance with law, no useful purpose will be served by setting aside the impugned order even though the reasoning of the First Appellate Court to set aside the order of the Trial Court was not correct. I, therefore, do not find any merit in this appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed. Appeal dismissed.