MOHAMMAD IZHAR Vs. DELHI WAQF BOARD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The present writ petition pertains to the management of a Waqf property known as the 'Bari Masjid (Old Idgah)', Sarai Khalil, Sadar Bazar, Delhi-110006'. On 8.4.1983, a Management Committee had been appointed under the erstwhile Waqf Act, 1954 by the Waqf Board. That Committee continued in office till 25.1.2002. The petitioners were office bearers in that Management Committee. By an order dated 25.1.2002, the Chairman of the Waqf Board, i.e., respondent No. 2, dissolved the earlier Managing Committee and appointed a new Managing Committee.

(2.) The grievance of the petitioner is that the Chairman of the Waqf Board had no powers to dissolve the earlier Managing Committee or to appoint a new Managing Committee in its place. The learned Counsel Mr. Barqi, who appears on behalf of the petitioners, pointed out the provisions of Section 67 of the Waqf Act, 1995 which would be the applicable Act. Section 67 of the said Act provides that whenever the supervision or management of a Waqf is vested in any Committee appointed by the Waqf, then, notwithstanding anything contained in the said Act, such committee shall continue to function until it is superseded by the Board or until the expiry of its term as specified by the Waqf Board, whichever is earlier. In the present case, the learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that there was no term fixed for the earlier Management Committee and, therefore, it could continue until and unless it was superseded by the Board in accordance with law. The learned Counsel's submission is that the Board comprised of the Chairperson and other members as indicated in Section 14 of the said Act. It is his contention that the Chairperson alone could not take any action in the name of the Board and, it is his contention, that the impugned order dated 25.1.2002 which has been passed by the Chairman is not a decision of the Board and is, therefore, illegal and requires to be set aside.

(3.) On the other hand, learned Counsel appearing for the Waqf Board has submitted that Section 27 of the said Act provides for delegation of powers by the Board. By virtue of this provision the Board may, by the general or special order in writing, delegate to the Chairperson or any other Member, Secretary, etc., subject to such conditions and limitations as may be specified in the said order, such of its powers and duties under the said Act as it may deem necessary. The learned Counsel for the respondent Waqf Board has pointed out that Resolution No. 2 passed by the Waqf Board authorises the Chairperson to constitute and form various committees, including the "Masjid and Kabristan" Committees. It is his contention that it is in exercise of this delegated power that the Chairperson has passed the impugned order dated 25.1.2002. He further indicates that a show cause notice dated 5.9.2001 had been issued by the Chief Executive Officer of Delhi Waqf Board to the erstwhile Managing Committee, of which the petitioners were members. However, in the show cause notice, the period of time given for response was admittedly only 15 days. The petitioners did not respond to the said show cause notice and, accordingly, the Chairperson passed the order which is impugned herein. It is, however, the learned Counsel for the petitioners' contention that such a notice was not received by the petitioners who were the office bearers of the erstwhile Managing Committee, Learned Counsel for the petitioners also referred to the proviso to Sub-section 2 of Section 67 of the Act which clearly provides that the Board shall, before making any order superseding any Committee, issue a notice calling upon the Committee to show cause within such time, not being less than one month, as may be specified in the notice as to why such action shall not be taken. It is clear that the notice that was issued on 5.9.2001 did not provide for the minimum period of one month as required under the statute. It appears ex facie that the statutory provision providing for less than one month notice has not been followed. However, at the same time, learned Counsel for the respondent Waqf Board submits that the question of prejudice would also have to be considered and since no prejudice, according to him, has been caused to the petitioners, this would be a mere technicality.