(1.) This petition involved an important question of law regarding the inherent powers of High Court vis-a-vis the scope and ambit of the provisions contained under Sub Section 3 of Section 39, Code of Criminal Procedure. It is well settled that the inherent power of the Court can ordinarily be exercised when there is no express provision on the subject matter. Where there is an express provision, barring a particular remedy, the Court cannot resort to the exercise of inherent powers. The Supreme Court in the case of Madhu Limaye Vs. State reported in AIR 1978 Supreme Court page 47 has laid down three principles in relation to exercise of inherent powers of the High Court:
(2.) The Supreme Court in subsequent decisions in Raj Kapoor, Vidyacharan Shukla and Municipal Corporation .of Delhi, affirmed the ratio laid down in Madhu Limaye's case. However, in the case of Madhu Limaye, the Supreme Court was examining the impact on the inherent power on account of the bar of remedy of revision against the interlocutory order provided under Sub Section (2) of Section 397 Criminal Procedure Code . and came to the conclusion that the inherent power of the High Court cannot be taken away because of the complete bar of remedy of revision provided under Sub Section (2) of Section 397. Interlocutory orders were amenable to the revisonal jurisdiction and, therefore, the inherent power of the High Court cannot be abrogated. But in that case the Supreme Court was not dealing with sub Section (3) 397. Where the remedy is not completely barred but availing of that remedy second time is prohibited.
(3.) In order to determine whether this Court can entertain second revision filed by an unsuccessful revisionist, it will be worthwhile to know in brief the facts of the Case.