RATTAN SINGH Vs. ESTATE OFFICER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) There is no dispute that no application for condonation of one day's delay in filing the appeal was filed along with the main appeal.

(2.) Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, submits that although no written application for condonation of one day's delay was filed but in fact he did make an oral application before the Additional District Judge for the same on the ground the son and brother of the petitioner were implicated in a false and frivolous case at Ambala under Sections 307/332/353 and 125 of the Indian Arms Act and Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the TDPS Act vide FIR No.393 dated 14.8.1988 at Police Station Ambala City and he had to attend the Court at Ambala on 10th October, 1988 in that case and, therefore, he could not hand over the complete papers to his counsel to file the appeal before the Additional District Judge. On his return to Delhi on 11th October, 1988 he handed over the complete papers to his counsel who filed the appeal on that date itself. Therefore, there has been delay of one day in filing the appeal. According to him, this delay of one day was unintentional, bonafide and beyond the control of the petitioner and, therefore, the Additional District Judge ought to have accepted the oral prayer of the petitioner and condoned the one day's delay in filing the appeal. However, the learned Additional District Judges has not explained any where in the order about this. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.

(3.) It is no doubt true that no written application has been filed by the petitioner seeking condonation of one day's delay in filing the appeal. In the interest of justice, however, in order to promote the administration of justice, the oral application of the petitioner ought to have been entertained by the Additional District Judge and the relief under Section 5 of the Limitation Act ought to have been granted. It is settled principle of law that the term 'sufficient' cause which finds place in Section 5 of the Limitation Act has to be liberally construed in order to promote the cause of substantial justice. In Raizada Sanwal Das v. Kanhya Lal and others (1966 - II DLT 421) Justice Dua has held that a written application for claiming relief under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, is not essential and in a fit case, it is open to a Court without a written application to give relief under this section if the interests of justice so require. The matter pertains to the discretion of the Court, albeit judicial discretion, but the term "sufficient cause" has to be liberally construed in order to promote the cause of substantial "justice', holding the scales even between the contesting litigants.