LAWS(DLH)-1992-3-8

AKHIL CHANDER BHATNAGAR Vs. LAJWANTI BHATNAGAR

Decided On March 11, 1992
AKHIL CHANDER BHATNAGAR Appellant
V/S
LAJWANTI BHATNAGAR Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) It is a very unfortunate case in which a widow mother was forced to file an eviction petition against her own son. In brief the facts of the case. as are apparent on the record, are that Smt. Lajwanti, respondent herein, alleging herself to be the owner landlady of the premises No. 6D, Bhagat Singh Street, Adarash Nagar, Delhi filed an evietion petition under Section 14(l)(e). 14C and 14D read with Section 25B of the Delhi Rent Control Act against Akhil Chander Bhatnagar, petitioner herein on the ground of personal bonafide requirement. In that eviction petition she alleged that she is a retired employee of Delhi Administration and that she is also a widow and she has no other alternative residential accommodation at Delhi and that she requires premises bonafide for her need.

(2.) Summons in Schedule III were sserved upon the petitioner who made apearance and filed an application u/s 25B(4) of the Delhi Rent Control Act seeking leave to defend the eviction petition. Various pleas were taken by the petitioner in the application for grant of leave. The ownership of Smt. Lajwanti was challenged. The purpose of lettting as residential was also disputed. The bonafide need of the landlady was questioned. It is stated that she has been residing in Rishikesh most of the time and when in Delhi she stays at the house of her other son who has got sufficient accommodation. For the temporary stay at Delhi she is not entitled to the eviction of the suit premises. The main intention of the landlady is to enhance the rent and to put pressure upon the petitioner and she actually does not need the premises bonafide for her residence. The applicability ofSecion 14C and 14D has also been disputed.

(3.) The Addl Rent Controller did not Find any substance in the pleas taken by the tenant as far as the ground made out under Section 14C and 14D is concerned and passed an eviction order in view of the provisions of Section 14C and 14D but under Section 14(1)(e) leave was granted only on the limited point of the purpose of letting.