MILVI DEVI Vs. DINA NATH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This second Appeal under Section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') is directed against the judgment and order of the Rent Control Tribunal dated 4th March, 1981 passing an order of eviction against the appellant under Section 14(1)(c)of the Act and giving him benefit under Section 14(2) of the Act. Briefly the facts are that the appellant has been a tenant in one room, one tin-shed, one kitchen, terrace, water tap (common) one Kolki (common), latrine (joint) on the first floor of premises No. 4490 situated at Gali Bhagat Singh Shaid, Paharganj, New Delhi on a monthly rent of Rs. 8.00 under the respondent. The respondent in 1970 filed a petition for eviction of the appellant on the grounds mentioned in clauses (d) and (e) of the proviso to Section 14(1) of the Act. On 10th January, 1972 the Rent Controller passed an order of eviction under Section 14(1) (e) but rejected the ground of eviction mentioned in Section 14(1)(d). The appellant-tenant filed an appeal before the Tribunal which was accepted and the eviction application was dismisled. The respondent-landlord filed second appeal in this court which was dismissed on 9th April, 1975 by Avadh Behari, J. The respondent had served a notice of demand and eviction upon the appellant demanding arrears of rent since 1st February, 1972 at Rs. 8.00 per month. The eviction petition out of which this appeal has arisen was filed on 18th April, 1975 claiming eviction under clauses (a), (d), (c) & ( of Section 14(1) of the Act alleging that the appellant had been in arrears of rent since 1st February, 1972 at Rs. 8.00 per month, that she neither paid nor tendered rent inspite of notice of demand dated 12th November, 1973, that neither she nor any member of her family had been residing therein for a period of six months prior to the institution of the eviction application, that she had shifted from Delhi and had been living at Ranchi with her son where she had acquired another residence. Lastly eviction was claimed on the ground that the premises were let for residence and were required by him and his family members as they had no other suitable residential accommodation, that the respondent's son was married and that there had been change of circumstances since the dismissal of the previous eviction application, that the landlord's son's wife was not on happy terms with the landlord's wife and that he wanted to settle them on the first floor and wanted to live himself on the ground floor having a separate mess. The appellant contested the eviction application pleading that the present eviction application was barred by principles of res judicata, that she had been tendering rents and on refusal by the landlord she had been depositing rent and had deposited rent upto 31st May, 1975 in the office of the Rent Controller, that she had not acquired any premises at Ranchi, that she had been residing in the suit premises, that the landlord did not require the premises bonafide for his residence, that previously the landlord got vacated a portion in the suit house which was on a monthly rent of Rs. 5.00 and was subsequently let out to one Mr. R.K. Saxena at Rs. 50.00 per month, that the family of the respondent consisted of himself and his wife only but with a view to create alleged ground introduced an adopted son and that no valid notice of demand was served. On 27th April, 1976 the Controller passed an order under Section 15(1) of the Act requiring the appellant to deposit arrears of rent at the rate of Rs. 8.00 per month with effect from 1st April, 1972 allowing her to deduct the amount of rent already deposited by him for the said period. On 25th January, 1978 the Rent Controller passed an order of eviction under clauses (a), (d) & (e) of Section 14(1) of the Act but rejected the ground of eviction mentioned in clause (h) of Section 14(1) of the Act. The appellant filed an appeal before the Tribunal but it was dismissed on 13th February, 1980 on the ground that it was barred by time. The second appeal filed in this court was also dismissed on 10th July, 1980 but on further appeal to the Supreme Court the delay in filing the appeal before the Tribunal was condoned and the case was remanded to the Rent Control Tribunal. The Rent Control Tribunal by the impugned order dated 4th March, 1981 accepted the appeal of the tenant with regard to the ground of eviction under Section 14(1) (a) & (d) of the Act giving him the benefit of Section 14(2) of the Act but dismissed the appeal so far as the ground of eviction under Section 14(1)(e) was concerned. Hence this second appeal.

(2.) Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the ingredients constituting the ground of eviction mentioned in Section 14(1)(e)ofthe Act were not pleaded by the respondent in his eviction petition and therefore the same was liable to be rejected. He submits that the landlord never pleaded that he was the owner of the suit premises and that he had no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation. Learned counsel for the respondent however submits that all the ingredients required under Section 14(l)(e) of the Act were properly pleaded. He submits that reading of clauses 14 and 18(a) of the eviction application would disclose that all ingredients were properly pleaded. Para 14 of the eviction application reads as under :

(3.) Learned counsel for the appellant next submits that eviction on ground of non-payment is not available to the respondent. He submits that the appellant had been tendering rent to the respondent-landlord from time to time but on his refusal the rent was used to be deposited under Section 27 of the Act. The appellant had deposited rent for the period ending March, 1973 at Rs. 8.00 per month under Section 27 of the Act. On 12th November, 1973 notice of demand was issued to the appellant requiring him to pay the arrears from 1st February, 1972 at Rs. 8.00 per month. There is no evidence on record that the appellant-tenant ever paid or tendered the admitted amount of arrears of rent for the period from 1st April, 1973 to the respondent landlord after the receipt of the notice of demand. Thus the respondent had a cause of action for eviction of the appellant under Section 14(1) (a) of the Act. An order under Section 15(1) was passed on 27th April, 1976 and it is not disputed that the appellant had complied with the same. As the appellant has deposited all rents in pursuance of the order dated 27th April, 1976 under Section 15(1) of the Act, no order for eviction on the ground specified in Section 14(1) (a) of the Act can be passed. He is entitled to the benefit under Section 14(2) of the Act.