ASHOK KUMAR Vs. LALA SRI KISHAN DASS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) I have had the advantage of reading the judgment of Dayal J., and I fully concur with the answers to the questions referred to the Full Bench which have been proposed by him.

(2.) The reference to the Full Bench is really the result, or consequence of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Damadilal and others V. Parashram and others, A.I.R. 1976, S.C. 2229(1). However, the amendment in the definition of 'tenant' which was introduced by the Delhi Rent Control Amendment Act No. 18 of 1976, was apparently based on the previously existing view regarding the nature of protection given to a tenant under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. At that time, the view was that a D tenant whose tenancy had expired and who had been given a notice to quit had only a personal right under the Act which came to an end on his death. Such a tenant, whose tenancy had expired, but who was protected from eviction by the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, was considered to be a merely 'statutory' tenant with a personal right to continue in possession. If was thought that the rights of such a person came to an end on his death; the right not being inheritable, this raised a question of general public importance affecting the lives of the citizens of Delhi in the sense that the majority of the population are tenants whose occupation in their homes is protected only by the Delhi Rent Control Act. This would mean that in the majority of cases when the tenant died, his heirs would have to leave hearth and home and seek some other premises because they no longer had the right to remain in occupation of the house they considered their home. To alleviate the distress which would be caused to such heirs, and also to combat the problem that would be coursed by such displacement, the Legislature appears to have stepped in to extend the definition of 'tenant' to include certain heirs and dependents of a protected tenant, such as the spouse, son, daughter, parents, etc. The extension only applied to the persons who are actually living in the premises in question along with the deceased tenant, and only for their life times. It did not apply to the heirs of such additional persons.

(3.) It is not necessary for us to examine the effect of the judgment in Damadilal's case, as we are only concerned with certain constitutional questions which have led to the reference to this Full Bench. All the relevant cases have been referred to in the judgment of Dayal J. I do not, therefore, propose to examine those judgments. According to learned counsel for the tenants, we should strike down certain portions of the amendment so as to change the meaning of the provisions and -make it applicable to both business premises as well as non-business premises. We think that this power of altering the Legislative enactment is not available to us. We can either strike down the provision or uphold it, or we can strike down some un-constitutional portion. We cannot amend the Regislation to give different meaning to the statute. We must, therefore, confine ourselves to the questions referred to us by the referring order.