JAIN MOTOR CAR CO Vs. SHYAM PRABHA JAIN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The question for decision in this second appeal Under Section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') is : Whether the tenant is entitled to benefit under Section 14(2) of the Act if he deposits only the arrears of rent and not future monthly rent by the 15th of the succeeding month in pursuance of an order of the Controller passed under Section 15 of the Act ?

(2.) Briefly the facts are that Shri Prem Chand Jain predecessor of respondent No. I on 20th January, 1971 filed an application for eviction of the appellant-tenant Jain Motor-Car Company and Brij Behari Lal Jain, respondent No. 2 under Section 14(l)(a) & (b) of the Act alleging that the appellant was a tenant in a portion of Municipal House No. XI/4239A, Raj Kishan Jain Street, I Ansari Road, Delhi on a monthly rent of Rs. 200.00 besides water and electricity charges, that he had been in arrears of rent since 1st June, 1970 which he failed to pay in spite of a notice of demand dated 6th November, 1970 within two months of the service of notice of demand, that the notice of demand was served on 18th November, 1970, that the appellant paid Rs. 800.00 by cheque on 21st November, 1970 and that the appellant had sublet, assigned or otherwise parted with possession of the whole of the suit premises to respondent No. 2 without obtaining his consent. The appellant denied the grounds of eviction. He pleaded that he paid Rs. 200.00 by cheque on 5th December, 1970 and another sum of Rs. 290.00 by another cheque dated 5th January 1971. He denied the ground of subletting. The Controller on 24th March, 1971 passed an order under Section 15(1) of the Act requiring the appellant to deposit arrears of rent @ Rs. 200.00 per month with effect from 1st June, 1970 upto date within one month from the date of the order after adjusting the amount of Rs. 800.00 admittedly received by the landlord. The appellant was further directed to deposit future monthly rent at the rate of Rs. 200.00 by the 15th of each succeeding month. An appeal was filed by the appellant challenging the said order under Section 15(1) of the Act but it was dismissed on 21st January, 1972. The appellant deposited all arrears of rent as well as future monthly rent in accordance with the order dated 24th March, 1971 passed under Section 15(1) of the Act excepting the rent for the month of February, 1972 which was deposited on 30th March, 1972. The landlord filed an application for striking off the defence of the appellant under Section 15(7) of the Act. The Controller dismissed his application on 24th April, 1972 and the appeal was dismissed by the Tribunal on 19th April, 1973. The landlord therefore filea second appeal (S.A.O. No. 198 of 1973) in this court on 25th June, 1973 challenging the dismissal of his application under Section 15(7) of the Act. The Additional Controller by his judgment and order dated 27th October, 1975 passed an order of eviction under Section 14(l)(a) of the Act against the appellant but dismissed the landlord's prayer for eviction under Section 14(l)(b) of the Act. The Additional Controller held that the appellant committed default in deposit of rent for the month of February, 1972 within the time prescribed under Section 15(1) of the Act and therefore the appellant was liable to be evicted under Section 14(l)(a) of the Act. The tenant filed an appeal before the Tribunal and the landlord filed cross objections. The appeal and the cross-objections were dismissed by the Tribunal by its judgment and order dated 20th March, 1978. The tenant filed this second appeal (S.A.O. No. 125 of 1978) in this court under Section 39 of the Act. The suit property was gifted on 5th August, 1978 to Smt. Swayam Prabha Jain. She was sub- stituted by order dated 29th November, 1979.

(3.) Learned counsel for the appellant submits that all arrears of rent in accordance with order dated 24th March, 1971 passed under Section 15(1) of the Act were deposited by the appellant within one month of the date of the order. He further submits that future monthly rent for the period ending January, 1972 were also deposited by him by the 15th of the succeeding month. He admits that the appellant, however, failed to deposit rent for the month of February, 1972 by 15th March, 1972 and in fact deposited the same on 30th March, 1972. His contention is that the rent could not be deposited in time as attorney of the appellant had fallen ill and Ajit Prasad Jain partner of the appellant had forgotten the date of deposit on account of being busy in connection with the election in which his brother was also a candidate. He submits that this was sufficient cause for the failure of the appellant to deposit rent for February, 1972 upto 15th March, 1972. Learned counsel for the respondent- landlord submits that the appellant is a partnership firm, that if the attorney had fallen ill, there were other persons including partners who ought to have taken steps for deposit of future monthly rent. His submission is that it was not a bona fide default but a mala fide one. He says that the appellant had parted with the possession of the premises to respondent No. 2 and as respondent No. 2 had not paid the rent to the appellant, monthly rent was not deposited. Learned counsel for the respondent submits that the judgment and order of the Additional Controller and the Tribunal dismissing his application under Section 15(7) of the Act for striking off the defence of the appellant is not sustainable in law. Learned counsel for the appellant on the other hand submits that the appea against the order dismissing the application under Section 15(7) of the Act dees not involve any substantial questions of law and therefore the same is liable to be dismissed. In support of his appeal he submits tht thae appellant is entitled to protection against eviction under Section 14(2) of the Act if he had deposited only the arrears of rent in pursuance of the order dated 24th March, 1971 passed under section 15(1) of the Act. In other words, his contention is that Section 15 of the Act contains two parts. According to him first part of an order under Section 15 of the Act requires the tenant to deposit all arrears of rent and the second part requires the tenant to deposit future monthly rent. He submits that under Section 15(7) of the Act if the tenant fails to make deposit in accordance with the order under Section 15 of the Act it is discretionery with the Controller to strike off the defence against eviction. He submits that the defence of the appellant was not struck off by the Controller and therefore the appellant is not liable to eviction if he has committed default in depositing future monthly rent i.e. in complying with the second part of the order under Section 15(1) of the Act.