MANISH AGGARWAL Vs. SEEMA AGGARWAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The scope and ambit of Section 19 of The Family Courts Act, 1984 (hereinafter referred to as the =said Act') has to be examined by us in the present appeal.

(2.) The said Act was enacted with a view to promote conciliation and secure speedy settlement of disputes relating to marriage and family affairs and to deal with matters connected therewith so as to have a composite statute to deal with various aspects. Though the statute was enacted much earlier, its implementation has been done in a phased manner as the pre-requisite was the establishment of the Family Courts under Section 3 of the said Act. For example, in most districts of Delhi such Family Courts now stand established but still not in all. Chapter 5 of the said Act deals with Appeals & Revisions and Section 19 of the said Act is the only Section falling under this chapter which reads as under:

(3.) The aforesaid controversy has arisen as the appellant has filed the present appeal to assail the impugned order dated 18.4.2012 passed by the Family Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to grant interim maintenance under the second proviso to Section 125 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the =Cr.P.C.') We have examined the scope and ambit of this appeal provision qua the different nature of orders which are passed by the Family Court as no appeal can be filed against a judgement or order of the Family Court which is an interlocutory order [see Section 19 (1) of the said Act] and no appeal lies in respect of an order, inter alia, which is passed under Chapter IX of the Cr.P.C. [see Section 19 (2) of the said Act]. We may note at the threshold that in FAO No.52/2012 titled Preety Bhardwaj Vs. Deepak Kumar Bhardwaj decided on 21.2.2012 passed by a Division Bench of this Court, wherein the judgement was authored by one of us (Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.), the Court dealt with the impact of the absence of Rules under Section 21 of the said Act on the efficacy of the provision of Section 19 (1) read with subsections (5) & (6) of Section 19 of the said Act. In that context it was observed that a statutory right of appeal is created under Section 19 (1) of the said Act and such an appeal has to be heard by a Bench consisting of two or more Judges as per Section 19 (6) of the said Act, and the absence of Rules, which are to be framed by the High Court under Section 21 of the said Act, would not dilute the mandate of the legislation as contained in Section 19 of the said Act, especially in view of the use of the expression 'may' in Section 21 of the said Act. In another order in FAO No.448/2011 titled Ashwani Mehta Vs. Vibha Mehta decided on 19.10.2011, once again, the scope of Section 19 (1) and 19 (6) of the said Act, which were brought to the notice of the Court was discussed. In a short order the appeal against an order under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. was entertained, without any discussion in the light of the other provisions, and in that context a passing observation was made that the order of the Family Court is appealable under Section 19 of the said Act. This order is also authored by one of us (Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.). However, in the present case the scope of exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court qua different kinds of orders passed by the Family Court, in the exercise of jurisdiction available under Section 19 of the said Act has been brought to our notice and considered by us, so that the principles are settled in respect of the judgements and orders of the Family Courts, from which an appeal or revision may be maintainable. Since this is a frequent issue arising, we have considered it appropriate to hear learned counsels for the parties at length to remove any ambiguity.