MANOJ JAIN Vs. KRISHNA JAIN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) IN this case, evidence of both the parties was completed and which is recorded in the order dated 26.4.2010. By the order of that date, the case was listed in the category of 'Finals'. The suit thereafter came out from the category of 'Finals' because the defendant no.2 made an application for discovery and production of certain documents and which was allowed by the order dated 7.4.2011. The application for discovery and production was filed on the basis that the plaintiff had with him certain properties, namely shares and securities, of which account must be rendered by the plaintiff. The plaintiff in terms of the order dated 7.4.2011 has filed compliance affidavit, which however according to the defendant No.2 does not comply with the order dated 7.4.2011. The plaintiff has thereafter moved an application being I.A.No. 10353/2012 for directions to certain companies to give the present status of the shares, so that better particulars can be given with respect to the shares and securities details of which were ordered to be filed by the plaintiff pursuant to the order dated 7.4.2011. I am not taking up the issues of the compliance of the order dated 7.4.2011 and I.A. No.1035/2012 filed by the plaintiff inasmuch as these aspects are being covered as per the judgment being passed hereinafter.

(2.) IN my opinion, once the suit is ripe for final arguments, the filing of repeated applications by one party or the other should not be permitted and the suit itself should be disposed of when the same very much can be. Considering the facts of the present case, which I am stating hereinafter, and which will not even require evidence of the parties to be referred to, I wanted to hear and dispose of the suit, but, when I put this to the counsel for defendant no.2, he states that the Court can pass any order. I have failed to understand this sort of attitude inasmuch as the counsel for the plaintiff agrees that the suit can be disposed of in terms of the stand taken by the defendant nos. 2 to 4 themselves in their written statement. Plaintiff also accepts that the plaintiff is liable to render accounts with respect to the shares and securities as aforementioned. I therefore refuse to subscribe to the manner in which adjournments are sought in suits which can be disposed of on the admitted basis, and which in any case are ripe for final arguments and were in fact in the recent past put in the 'Finals' category.

(3.) LEARNED counsel for the plaintiff argues that let the case of the defendant nos. 2 to 4 as pleaded in the written statement be accepted that the property is a HUF property. Learned counsel for the plaintiff further argues that since after amendment of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 by Act 39 of 2005 w.e.f. 9.9.2005, the daughters have an equal right to that of the son in the HUF property therefore the suit can be decreed by passing a preliminary decree giving the daughters also their shares of the properties, and only because of which issue/dispute the suit remains pending. Learned counsel for the plaintiff has in my opinion rightly relied upon Section 6(1) of the said Act which specifically provides that now daughters will have an equal share as a male coparcener in the HUF properties. Therefore in my opinion once we accept the admitted case of defendant nos. 2 to 4 in their written statement that there was a HUF, the suit accordingly will have to be decreed on that accepted basis that there was a HUF of which father late Sh. Lakhpat Rai was the karta, the plaintiff and defendant nos. 2 to 4 (sons) were male coparceners and defendant nos. 5 and 6 (daughters of Sh. Lakhpat Rai) and defendant No.1/mother would be the family members of the HUF and all the parties to the suit have an equal share in the properties of the HUF, including the house C-9, NPSE-II, New Delhi.