(1.) Considerable interest has been generated in these petitions since Counsel for the parties have contended that the controversy is not covered by any directly applicable precedent. The legal issue which has arisen centres around the interpretation of S.33 and 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The factual matrix, as averred by the Petitioner/Workman, is that the Indian Express Union had raised Industrial Dispute No. 101/1987 and 148/1987 regarding several issues such as milk allowance etc. which were pending before the Industrial Tribunal No.I, Delhi. In January/February 1992, the Petitioners' names were allegedly transferred from the 'Pucca' to the 'Kucha' Registers maintained by the Respondents in their Newsprint Department, thereby altering the service relationship that had existed during the previous five/six years. The Petitioners lodged their protest in terms of the letter dated 5.5.1992 which failed to bring about the desired remedy. The sequel was that the Petitioners filed a complaint under S.33A of the I D Act in which their complaint, inter alia, was that while giving 16 (sic. 16%) bonus to most of the workmen, the Petitioners were only given 8% bonus; while the colleagues were given weekly off days, this was denied to the Petitioners; that the Petitioners were not paid the same wages as their colleagues. It does not appear that the Petitioners' cause was espoused by the Labour Union despite the self-serving statement in the writ petition to the effect that the Petitioners became active members of the Indian Express Employees Union which fact was allegedly not liked by the Management. It is the Petitioners' case that their services were terminated. in May 1993. Thereupon, the second salvo of a complaint under S.33A, in substantially identical language but seeking the relief of their reinstatement with full back wages, was filed by the Petitioners in November 1993. These pleadings have been controverted by the Respondents. They have averred that the Petitioners were employed by Messrs Royal Security Services who were providing the Respondent with newsprint handling services. It is the Management's assertion that the Petitioners were paid their wages by Royal Security Services only.
(2.) I do not propose to reflect on the rival factual stands in any greater detail, since the first complaint, prior to the 'dismissal' of the Petitioners has been disposed of by the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal I by the Order dated 10.6.1997 and the second complaint by Order dated 28.8.1997 on the preliminary issue of their non-maintainability. It is these Orders that have been assailed in this batch of writ petitions, which have also not been filed through the aegis or initiative or espousal of any of the concerned labour unions.
(3.) Common law recognizes the untrammelled freedom to contract. One aspect of it is the unfettered liberty to 'hire and fire' and this has even been incorporated into the Specific Relief Act which enunciates that injunctory relief ought not to be granted if it tantamounts to the enforcement of personal services. However, gradually it has been jurisprudentially accepted that where two parties are of such disparate social or economic status as would render illusory this freedom to contract, it is necessary that law should step in to affect a balance between them. Labour laws and Rent Control legislation, to cite two examples, evolved in the last century on this rationale, and came to constitute an extremely important branch of law which has been most frequently invoked. Now, while there is still unrestricted capacity to hire, labour laws have introduced rigours on the right to fire. This has been fortified by the introduction of S.2A in 1965, enabling a single dismissed workman to initiate an industrial dispute without the rigour of its espousal by the Union. In the case of workmen within the contemplation of the ID Act their services can be terminated on the grounds of ill-health or by way of punishment, or by their retrenchment as defined in S.2(oo) of the Act, or by their retirement. The introduction of S.2(oo)(bb) in 1984 merely clarifies that non-renewal of a contract of employment in terms of the contract would not amount to retrenchment. When it was found that contracts of service were structured and devised by Managements in such a manner as to defeat the protection sought to be imparted by the ID Act, Parliament again stepped in to alleviate the plight of the workmen, in the terms of The Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition), Act 1970. There is yet another restraint placed on the capacity of the Management to terminate the services of a workman, incorporated in S33(2)(b) of the ID Act. It is however conditional, and intended to plug any unfair labour practice that may be adopted to subjugate the labour already embroiled in an industrial dispute.