JAGDISH PRASAD Vs. UNION OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) . Doubting the correctness of an observation made by a Division Bench of this court in Shish Pal Singh & Ors. v. UOI in CWP 5071/99 disposed of on 23/08/1999 to the effect that in the matter of maintenance of a live casual labour register, cause of action is a continuous one, a Division Bench of this court referred the matter to Full Bench by an order dated 7th February 2002 and that is how the matter has been placed before us. FACTS The petitioner allegedly was appointed as a Hot Weather Waterman during summer season under Station Superintendent, Bangarmau in the District of Morabad of Northern Railway Administration on 29/05/1983. He was disengaged at the end of the summer season. He was again appointed in the summer seasons of 1984, 1985 and 1986 at different stations within the same Division. He last performed his duty from 16/04/1986 to 14/07/1986. By reason of a Circular dated 28/08/1987, a provision has been made for maintenance of Live Casual Labour Register, inter alia, on the ground that complaints had been received that those who had worked earlier were not being engaged as and when subsequent requirements arose. The petitioner on or about 24/09/1987 made a request for placing his name on the said Register. He did not receive any reply. He did not carry the matter further and made a further representation only on or about 20th May 1998. Finding no response from the respondents, he filed an Original Application No. 444/2000 before the Tribunal. Before the learned Tribunal, reliance was placed on the decision of this court in Shish Pal Singh (supra). The learned Tribunal, however, referred to a Full Bench decision with regard to the question of limitation in an identical case and held:

(2.) . Mr. Bhandari, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner would submit that keeping in view the fact that name of a Casual Labour is to be recorded in the said Register only on his completion of 120 days in service, there does not appear any reason why the learned Tribunal rejected the petitioner's application despite the fact that the petitioner had existing right in this court in terms of 1987 circular.

(3.) . The learned counsel would submit that in a case of this nature, the learned Tribunal ought to have condoned the delay in filing the Original Application.