RUKAN SINGH TEWATIA Vs. UNION OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Heard learned Counsel for the petitioner. By thiswrit petition, the petitioner seeks to quash the decision of the Governmentdated 7/04/1991, cancelling the nomination of the petitioner as theChairman of the Indian Sugarcane Development Council, and nominating thesecond respondent as Chairman of the said Council in his place. A furtherdirection is sought that the respondent No. 1 be restrained from implementingthe said order or from taking any steps for implementation thereof. By aresolution dated 30th January, 1991, the Ind Indian Sugarscane DevelopmentCouncil was reconstituted. Earlier, it was constituted by the Resolution dated 7/01/1987. Clause 5 of that Resolution reads as under :-

(2.) The petitioner's case is that he was nominated as the Chairmanof the aforesaid Council and thereafter by order dated 7/04/1991, bisnomination was cancelled and in his place, respondent No. 2 was nominated.According to the petitioner, that could not have been done till his term of 3years had expired. The petitioner's case further is that the aforesaid Councilhas been constituted under the Sugar Development Fund Act, 1982 and assuch once the statutory power has been exercised by the Central Governmentconstituting the Council, and nominating Chairman therein, the Governmenthas no power or authority to cancel the same. First of all, we may consider,as to whether the Council has been constituted under the Sugar DevelopmentFund Act, 1982. It may be stated that the order dated 30.1.1991 is in theform of a resolution of the Government of India, whereby the Council has beenreconstituted. It nowhere states that -the Council has been constituted inexercise of any statutory power or authority. A perusal of the provisions ofSugar Development Fund Act, 1982 would show that it envisages constitution of a committee. The word 'committee ' has been defined under Sec. 2(a)to mean, a committee constituted under Section 6. The-Sugar DevelopmentFund Act, 1982 was enacted with a view to provide financing activities fordevelopment of sugar industry and for matters connected therewith or incidentalthereto. Section 6 of the said Act provide that, for the purpose of securingspeedy consideration and disposal of applications received under Section 5and for considering any problems arising in the course of the administration ofthis Act, the Central Government may constitute a committee of officers ofthat Government. The composition of the Committee and the procedure tobe followed by the Committee in the discharge of its functions under the Actshall be such as may be prescribed. Section 6, therefore, envisages prescribingof the composition of the committee and the procedure to be followed by thecommittee in the discharge of its functions. Section 5 of the Act lays downthat every application for loan or grant under Section 4 shall be made to theCommittee in such manner and in such form as may be prescribed. It wouldappear from the resolution dated 30.1.91 that no committee has been constituted. It contemplates constitution of Indian Sugarcane DevelopmentCouncil and not a committee. So, this resolution cannot be considered to havebeen issued in exercise of any power conferred by any provision of the SugarDevelopment Fund Act, 1982. To us, it appears that the said Council has beenconstituted not under any statute but in exercise of its executive power by theGovernment of India. The functions of the Council have been enumeratedin clause 2 of the resolution. They do not conform with the functions of thecommittee under the Act. Thus, in our opinion, this submission of the learnedCounsel for the petitioner has no merit that the said Council has been constituted under the Sugar Development Fund Act, 1982.

(3.) When the Government of India has exercised its executive powerin constituting the Council, then, in our opinion, it possesses the power toreconstitute the Council as and when it likes. The aforesaid clause 5 also provides that the period of 3 years can be curtailed or extended by the specificorders of the Government of India. The very fact that there can be reconstitution would mean that curtailment of the period of the existing Chairman ornon-official members of the Council can also be done. Thus, the Governmentcan reconstitute the Council and assuch, in our opinion, the petitioner'sgrievance has no validity in the eye of law and it is not open to the peti-tioner to challenge the cancellation of his nomination as Chairman of theCouncil.