SHER SINGH Vs. UNION OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In pursuance to a notification dated November 13, 1959 under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act 1984 (hereinafter called the Act) appellant's land in Village Nimri was acquired. An award No. 1274 dated June 20, 1962 pertains to compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Collector (hereinafter called the Collector). The Collector divided the land into two categories having nomenclature as Block A and Block B, and fixed the market value of the land m Block A and Block B as under : Name of the Block Lend without Land with garden garden Block A Rs.2500 Rs.3000 Block B Rs-7000 Rs-2500 Apart from the above categories there was some land which Was being used either as a Path or water channels. That land mearored about 11 bighas and 3 biswas and the Collector allowed Rs. 500 / per bigha for that kind of the land. Appellant Sher Singh has half share in the aforesaid land. Shiv Prasad and Sher Singh filed separate applications before the Collector on the ground that the compensation awarded to them was on the tower side and they were entitled to the additional amount at the rate of Rs. 601- per yard in addition to the amount payable in respect of the garden. The Collector, made reference on the basis of that application to the learned Additional District Judge. Shiv Prasad filed LA. No. 405167 and the appellant Sher Singh L.A. 406167 for enhancement of compensation. Both these references were consolidated by the learned Additional District Judge and were disposed of by a common judgment. The learned Additional District judge vide his -judgment dated February 3, 1968 dismissed both these claims of Shiv Prasnd and the appellant Sher Singh after considering the relevant circumstances.

(2.) Dissatisfied with the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge, Delhi, appellant Sher Singh filed the present appeal before this Court. The appellant placed reliance on two decisions of this Court : Chattar Singh Vs. Union of India (R.F.A. 92 of 1969) (1) decided on December 20. 1984 -and Hukam Chand Jain Vs. Union of India, 43 (19911 Delhi Law Times 221(2). According to the appellant these decisions squarely cover his case because land of the same Village Nimri was involved in these cases which was acquired in pursuance to the same notification dated November 13, 1959. The counsel appearing for the respondent Union of India has not disputed the factual position but challenged the correctness of this Court's directions in these cases pertaining to solatium, interest and additional amount at the rate of 12 per cent on the market value. It was further submitted that directions given by this Court in these cases are not in consonance with the provisions of law as interpreted by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Union of India Vs. Raghubir Singh AIR 1989 S.C. 1933 (3). This Court vide its judgment dated February 22. 1991 decided the case of Kazan Singh Vs. Union of India (R.F.A. 13711980) (4). This was the leading Judgment but by the same judgment a very large number of appeals were disposed of by this court following the principles laid down in Raghubir Singh's case. In order to appreciate the rival contentions it is necessary to refer to a few relevant provisions of the Act prior to its amendment and the provisions as they stand after amendment :

(3.) Immediately after the amendment in 1984 the Supreme Court had the occasion to deal with the amended provisions of the Act in the case of K. Kamalajammannivaru Vs. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 1985 S.C. 576(5). The Court observed in the said case that awards made by the Collector under Section 11 and by the Court on reference under Section 18 are only described as awards in the Land Acquisition Act, while further appeals are provided to the High Courts and Supreme Court. The relevant portion of the Court's observations are set out as under :- "The new S. 23(2), of course, necessarily applies to awards made by the Collector or Court after the Commencement of the Act, that is, after September 24, 1984 which was the date on which the Act received the assent of the President. The Bill which ultimately became the Amendment Act was introduced into Parliament on April 30, 1982. Parliament obviously desired to give. effect to the amended S. 23(2) from the date of introduction of (he Bill. So the amended provision was expressly made applicable by Section 30(2) to awards made by the Collector or Court between April 30, 1982 and September 24, 1984 also. A natural corollary was that the new provision should apply to orders made by the High Court or by the Supreme Court in appeals against such awards, that is, awards made between April 30, 1982 and September, 24, 1984. Parliament did not intend and could not have intended that whatever be the date of the award, however ancient it may be, solatium would stand enhanced to 'thirty per centum' if an appeal happened by chance or accidently, to be pending on April 30, 1982. Surely it was not the intention of Parliament to reward those who kept alive the litigation even after several years. It was the intention of Parliament to make the amended S. 23(2) applicable to all proceedings relating to compensation wherever they be pending, the words after the 30th day of April, 1982 (the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition Amendment Bill, 1982 in the House of the People) and before the commencement of this Act" in Sec. 30(2) would become meaningless. It is clear that Parliament wanted the amended S. 23(2) to have very limited retrospectivity. It made the provision applicable to awards made after April 30, 1982 and before September, 24, 1984 also and further to appeals to the High Court and the Supreme Court arising from such awards". In the same year a similar matter seeking interpretation of the amended provisions again came up for adjudication before a bench of three Judges of the Supreme Court in Bhag Singh Vs. Union Territory of Chandigarh, AIR 1985 S.C. 1576(6). The Court in the said judgment also considered the earlier judgment delivered by two Judges in Kamalajammannivaru's case (supra). The Court declared that decision in the case of Kamalajsmmannwaru cannot be regarded as laying down the correct law in regard to the interpretation of Section 30(2). The ratio of the said judgment is that the amended provisions of Section 23(2) and 28 are applicable to all the proceedings relating to compensation, pending on the date of commencement of Amending Act or filed subsequent to that date before the Collector or before the High Court or Supreme Court. The only requirement is that, order must have been passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against such award after April 30, 1982 but before the commencement of the Amending Act. In the said judgment Court observed that if it were the intention of the Parliament to have applicability of the amended Section 23(2) and Section 28 only to the award made by the Collector or Court after 30th April, 1982 and before commencement of the Amending Act and to an order, made by the High Court or Supreme Court only against such an award Parliament would have inserted adverbial phrase "after 30th day of April 1982 and before commencement of this Act, immediately after the words, "any award made by the Collector or Court" so as to indicate clearly and beyond doubt that the adverbial phrase was intended to cover only award made by the Collector or Court and in that event the words "such award" would have carried only one meaning, namely, award made by the Collector or Court after 30th April. 1982 and before the commencement of the Act. The Court further observer : "any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against any such award", would then have had a limited meaning, namely, order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in an appeal preferred against an award made by the Collector or Court after 30th April, 1982 and before the commencement of the Amending Act. These words would not in that event have comprehended passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against an award made by the Collector or Court on or before 30th April, 1982. But Parliament deliberately ana advisedly introduced the adverbial phrase "after the 30th day of April, 1982 and before the commencement of this Act at the end of the sentence, so as to qualify both "any award made by the Collector or Court", as also "any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against any such award". The words 'such award' in the context in which they occur, mean only the award made by the Collector or Court and do not import the time element which finds place only at the end of the sentence and not immediately following the words "any award made by the Collector or Court". It is therefore clear that under Section 30, sub-section (2) the provisions of the amended Section 23, sub-section (2) and Section 28 are made applicable to all proceedings relating to compensation pending on 30th April. 1982 or filed subsequent to that date whether before the Collector or before the Court or the High Court or the Supreme Court, even if they have finally terminated before the enactment of the Amending Act. It would not be correct interpretation of Section 30, sub-section ( 2) to say that the provisions of the amended Section 23, sub-section (2) and Section 28 would be applicable in relation to an order passed by the High Court of Supreme Court only if the order is passed in appeal against an award made by the Collector or Court between 30th April, 1982 and the commencement of the Amending Act. Even if an award is made by the Collector or Court on or before 30th April, 1982 and in appeal against such award to pending before the High Court or the Supreme Court on 30th April, 1982 or is filed subsequent to that date, the provisions of the amended Section 23, sub-section (2) and Section 28 would be applicable in relation to an order passed in such appeal by the High Court or the Supreme Court. We accordingly affirm the view taken by the Bench of three Judges in Mohinder's case (supra) and express our respectful disagreement with the view taken by the Bench of two Judges in Kamalajammannivaru's case."