LAWS(DLH)-1981-5-3

BANWARI LAL AND SONS Vs. UNION OF INDIA

Decided On May 25, 1981
BANWARI LAL AND SONS PRIVATE LIMITED Appellant
V/S
UNION OF INDIA Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In the instant case building known as 1 Aurangzab Road, New Delhi, belonging to the appellants in Appeal No. 88 of 1973 was requisitioned by the Central Govt. by an order dated 27-8-42 under rule 75 of the Defence of India Rules, 1939. Subsequently the property was derequisitioned and possession was handed over to the appellants. Disputes arose between the parties regarding the payment of compensation. By an order dated 15-12-65. Sh. Ramaswamy Ayyar, Additional Legal Adviser in the Ministry of Law was appointed as an arbitrator under clause (b) sub-section (1) of Section 8 read with sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 19' 2 (the Act) by the Government. The arbitrator gave his award on 6-2-71. The owners were dissatisfied with the award. They filed appeal to the High Court under Section 11 of the Act. The Govt. also filed cross-objections. The learned Single Judge who heard the appeal enhanced the amount of compensation and dismissed the cross-objections. Against the said order of learned Single Judge these two appeals were filed by the parties. Appeal No. 88 is by the owners while appeal No. 92 is by the Government.

(2.) Question Involved: Whether these appeals are competent, under clause 10 of Letters Patent.

(3.) After noticing the observation of the Hon'ble the S.C. in the cases reported as 1958 S.C. 1947 Hans Kumar v. Union of India and 1968 S. C. 384, Collector Varonsi v. Gouri Shanker, it was held that it can safely be concluded that the decision of the High Court in appeal under Section II of the Act from the decision of the arbitrator is not a 'judgment' within the meaning of clause 10 of the Letters Patent. It is a "determination". Secondly the High Court acts as a court and not as a personal designata when it hears an appeal under Section 11 of the Act. Now if the decision of the High Court while hearing appeal under Section 11 is not a 'judgment' but only a 'determination', as was held in Collector of Varansi, no appeal will lie to the division Bench under clause 10 of the Letters Patent. Held further that arbitrations referred to in clause (g) of Section 8 (1) cover the entire proceeding from their commencement before the arbitrator to their termination in the High Court on appeal where an appeal has been preferred. Although the appeal is given to the "High Court" under Section 11, the appeal is against the "award of the arbitrator, it seems that the High Court in hearing and deciding the appeal is hearing an arbitration matter and its decision is as much as an award as that of the arbitrator. Though the High Court no doubt functions as a court, as has been held in Collector of Varansi, the nature of the proceeding do not change. The remain arbitration proceedings, pure and unalloyed. The High Court is no less bound than the arbitrator to have regard to the consideration set out in Section 8 of the Act. When the Single Judge varies the order of the arbitrator, what he does is that he substitutes his own award for that of the arbitrator. His assessment of compensation is also an award. If the proceedings throughout are arbitration proceedings it cannot be said that the decision of the Single Judge is a 'judgment' within clause 10 of the Letters Patent.