GURDIT SINGH BAJAJ Vs. RAMESH CHANDER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This second appeal under Section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 is directed against the judgment and order of the Rent Control Tribunal dated 30/11/1979. The appeal is barred by time, The appellant has filed this application, C.M. 2179/80, under the proviso to Section 39 of the Act. His contention is that after excluding the time spent by him in obtaining the certified copies of the order of the Rent Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal the appeal is within time. The copy of the order of the Tribunal was applied on 16/11/1979 and it was ready for delivery on 22/11/1979. The copy of the order of the Rent Controller was applied on 17/11/1979 and it was ready for delivery on 6/12/1979. This second appeal was filed on 1/2/1980.

(2.) The Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, is silent as to what procedure the High Court is to follow in dealing with the second appeals. An appeal in the High Court is governed by the normal procedure applicable to the second appeals in the High Court. The High Court in dealing With the second appeal under Section 39 of the Act must, therefore, act in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure and the Rules of this Court. In National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. v. James Chandwick & Bros. Ltd. (1953 Supreme Court Reports, Page 357) it was held that the High Court had to exercise its appellate jurisdiction under Section 76 of the Trade Marks Act, 1940, in the same manner as it exercised its other appellate jurisdiction as the Trade Marks Act did not make any provision with regard to the procedure to be followed by the High Court in the appeal. Again, in Collector, Vuranasi v. Gouri Shanker Misra and others, (A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 384) it is observed that the appeals under Section 19(l)(f) of the Defence of India Act, 1939, have to be disposed of just in the manner as other appeals to the High Court. It is further observed that after the appeal has reached the High Court, it has to be determined according to the rules of practice and procedure of that Court. Thus, it seems to me that the present appeal is governed by the rules of this Court besides the Code of Civil Procedure and the Limitation Act. Under Section 12(3) of the Limitation Act, the time spent in obtaining the certified copy of the impugned order is excluded for calculating the period of limitation for preferring an appeal. No provision has been pointed out to me under which the time spent by the appellant in obtaining the copy of the order of the first instance i.e. the Rent Controller ia this case can be excluded. Thus, if the lime spent in obtaining the copy of the order of the Tribunal is excluded the appeal ought to have been filed on or before 19/1/1980. As already stated, the appeal was filed on 1/2/1980.

(3.) In Bhagwan Dass Gupta v. Mukat Lal & others, (1970 The Punjab Law Reporter, Delhi Section, Page 78) it has been held that only those days which are spent by the appellant in actually obtaining the copy of the judgment of the court of first instance after the expiry of the period of limitation and till the delivery of the copy to him plus time as may be reasonably spent thereafter in drafting the grounds of appeal etc. would be regarded as sufficient cause for condonation of the delay in preferring the appeal under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It is also held that the time spent in obtaining the copy of the judgment of the court of first instance cannot be allowed under Section 12(3) of the Limitation Act. The tin. e for filing the appeal expired on 19/1/1980 and the order of the court of first instance in this case was ready for delivery on 6/12/1979, and as such it seems that the appellant was not prevented by any cause from filing the appeal within time i.e. on or before 19/1/1980. In the application for condonation delay there is no explanation why the second appeal was not filed during the period from 19/1/1980 to 1/2/1980. It is well settled that the appellant has to explain each day's delay. As there is no explanation the appeal is barred by time.