DELHI TRANSPORT CORPORATION Vs. SHANTI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal under section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 is directed against the judgment and award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal dated 23rd November, 1979. Learned counsel for the respondent took a preliminary objection that the appeal was barred by time. The certified copy of the Tribunal's judgment was applied on 6th December) 1979 and the same was ready for delivery on 5th March, 1980. The appeal wai listed for admission on 27th March, 1980, when it was adjourned to 18th April, 1980. On the later date the appeal was admitted and the appellant was directed to file the certified copy within time. In the application C.M. No. 3077 of 1981 under the proviso to section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, the appellant submits that the certified copy was sent by the Delhi Transport Corporation to its counsel on 18th March, 1981 but the clerk of the counsel Bhagwant Parshad instead of filing the same in court, placed the same in file and it remained lying in the file. This appeal was listed on 31st August, 1981 and it came up for hearing on 3rd September, 1981 when the objection regarding non-filing of the certified copy of the judgment was raised by the counsel for the respondent. The appellant on 4th September, 1981 filed the application G.M. No. 3077 of 1981 wherein the only ground taken is that the clerk of the counsel was negligent in placing the certified copy in the file instead of filing it in the court. Learned counsel for the respondent submits that a valuable right has accrued to the respondent- decree-holder and that the same should not be lightly disturbed. He further submits that the appellant has been negligent in view of the facts of the present case. Learned counsel for the appellant on the other hand submits that there was no negligence on the part of the appellant but it was the negligence at the most on the part of the clerk of the counsel for the appellant.

(2.) This appeal, as already stated, has been filed under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act. Rule 2(b) of Chapter 1-A of Vol. V of the Rules and Orders of the Punjab High Court as applicable to this Court provides

(3.) Learned counsel for the appellant submits that it was a mistake of the counsel's clerk and not a mistake of the appellant and therefore the delay should be condoned. He relies upon Lacchiman Das vs. Shri Suraj Parkash, XVIII (1980) Delhi Law Times 75==1980 Raj. Law Reporter 525 and Kuldip Singh vs. Krishan Kumar and others, IX (1973) Delhi Law Times 250 1973 R.G.R. 186. In these cases there was delay of six and seven days which was explained and therefore it was condoned. In Ramlal and others vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. A.I.R. 1962 Supreme Court 361 it has been observed that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives a rise to a right in favour of the decree holder to treat the, decree as binding between the parties and this legal right which has accrued to the decree holder by lapse of time should not be lightly disturbed. Further it has been held that the words 'sufficient cause' should receive liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fide is imputable to the appellant. It has been observed that the appellant is to explain the delay made after the last date of limitation day by day. In other words, it was held by the Supreme Court that in showing sufficient cause for condoning the delay the appellant is required to explain the whole of the delay covered by the period between the last day prescribed for filing the appeal and the day on which the appeal is filed. This Supreme Court judgment was re-affirmed in Mata Din vs. A. Narayanan A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1953 and The. State of West Bengal vs. The administrator, Howrah Municipality and others etc. A.I.R 1972 S.C. 749. In Mata Din (supra) it has been observed that the mistake of the counsel will not in every case by itself be sufficient ground to condone delay.