AMAR NATH BAHRI Vs. AI DAYAL PURI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The appellant herein is the tenant against whom the original petition for eviction was filed by the then landlord Jai Dyal Puri under proviso (e) to section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. 1958 (hereinafter called the Act) on "the ground that the premises were required bonafide by the lardlord for the residence of himself and his wife. The Controller dismissed the petition for eviction on the ground that the landlord did not really intend to come to live in these premises. He was living at Ludhiana where his sons were also Jiving. He was getting only a small pension and it was not believable that he really wauted to come to live in Delhi with his wife away fron his children with such a small income. In the appeal before the Kent Control Tribunal by the landlord, however, the Tribunal was of the view that the view of the Controller that the landlord did not really want to Come to live in Delhi was erroneous. The Tribunal believed the evidence of the landlord that he did not want to reside with any of his sens and that he and his wife wanted to live in Delhi in the premises in uispute. The finding offactgivenbyt.herribunalat the end of paragraph 6 of the judgment is as follows:-

(2.) The application by the appellant is C M. 1670-J of 1969. It merely states that the ground on which the eviction petition was filed by Jai Dyal Puri that he required the premises in suit for his own residence had become infructuous. It does not go further and state that the premises were not required bonafide by the wife of Jai Dyal Puri. The additional plea sught to be raised is that "the premises in question would no longer be required bonafide for the residence of the petitioner and members of his family." There is no plea sought to be raised that the widow of the deceased landlord alone would not need the premises bonafide. As the appellant has not in his application sought to amend the written statement to take the plea that the widow of the landlord does not need the premises bonafide and as the need of the landlord along With his wife has already been the subject-matter of the finding by the Kent Control Tribunal, no sufficient ground is made out by the appellant for the amendment of the written statement. Consequently, the question of remanding the case back to the trial Court for evidence on any new pleading does not arise. The necessity for the amendment of the pleading not being proved, the application is rejected.

(3.) Two questions arise for decision, the first being a question of law and the second primarily a question of fact, namely :-