ALI AHMED Vs. OSHAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The. premises in disputs forms part of a property, which was owned by one Abdul Rashid. The appellant was a tenant under him in respect of the said premises at a monthly rent of Rs. 12/8-. On March 27, 1957 the said property was sold by Abdul Rashid to the present respondent, together with the right to recover the arrears of rent due from the appellant. The appellant, thus, because a tenant under the respondent with effect from the said date of sale. On April 17, 1957 a notice or demand calling upon the appellant to pay all the arrears of rent was served on him. Not receiving any response, the respondent on May 28, 1957 filed a suit, under section 13 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952, herein called 'the Act', for the appellant's eviction from the said premises on the grounds that he had failed to pay the arrears of rent inspite of notice of demand, that he had changed the user of the shop from that of a milk seller to that of a Soda Water Factory, and that he had caused substantial damage to the premises. July 3, 1957 was the first day of hearing before the Court when the counsel for the parties were present. The case was adjourned to July 10. 1957, for the written statement of the appellant. On the said date. issues were framed after the written statement had been filed.

(2.) On February 12. 1958, statement of Public Witness 1, Abdul Rashid was recorded. He stated that he was previously the owner of the property and had sold the same to the respondent by means of a registered sale-deed, certified copy of which was exhibit PI. He had informed the appellant about this conveyance of the property and had asked him to pay rent including the arrears, to the respondent. On May 9, 1958, the adjourned date of hearing in the case, the parties filed a written compromise praying that a decree for ejectment with costs of the suit be passed in respondent's favour against the appellant, with a condition that if the appellant paid to the respondent by July 1, 1958, a sum of Rs. 300 in all consisting of Rs. 260 and Rs. 40 as the amount of rent, he will not be liable to eviction. Otherwise, after July 1, 1958, the respondent would be entitled to get the premises vacated by taking out execution of the dscree and also to recover Rs. 300 aforesaid. It was prayed that a decree in accordance with the terms of the said compromise be passed in respondent's favour against the appellant. The statement of the respondent's counsel and of the parties present was then recorded to the effect that the text of the compromise which had been read over to and understood by, them was correct. A prayer was made that the judgement be pronounced in accordance therewith. On this an order was passed for ejectment, in accordance with the said compromise. A condition of the decree was that if he appellant paid by July, 1958, a sum of Rs. 300 in all, the decree for ejectment and costs would be deemed to have been satisfied.

(3.) As the amount was not paid in accordance with the condition in the decree, the respondent-landlord applied for its execution, after obtaining the requisite permission from the Competent Authority under the Slum Areas (Improvement & Clearance) Act. The appellant- judgment-debtor filed objections under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with section 57 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, which in the meantime had come into operation, saying that at the time of the passing of the ejectment decree, there was no material on record lo make out the ground for ejectment, and that there was nothing from which the Court could satisfy itself about the existence of any of the grounds for ejectment. The decree was accordingly said to be against law and a nullity and, therefore, not executable. These objections were resisted by the respondent, decree-holder. The trial Court, however. found the decree to be valid and executable and dismissed the objections. The learned Additional Senior Sub-Judge, with enhanced appellate powers, concurring with the trial Court dismissed the appeal with costs. The appellant-tenant under these circumstances, has come up to this Court in second appeal.