MANOHAR LAL Vs. R B JAI CHAND LUTHRA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This second appeal by the tenant raises the question whether on the facts and in the circumstances of his case, he can be said to have obtained the benefit of sub-section (2) of section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, herein called 'the Act' in the earlier eviction proceedings against him.

(2.) The premises in dispute which belong to respondent-landlord consist of a garage in 131 Golf Links. New >elhi. The appellant, who is in occupation there of as a tenant under the respondent was a defaul- ter in payment of rent, which fell into arrears for the period from Jan- uary 1, 1962 to November 30, 1962. After serving a notice af demand the first eviction petition was filed by the respondent against the appellant under proviso (a) to section 14 {\) of the Act. At the first hearing, the parties counsel were present before the Controller. The appellant paid the entire arrears of rent to the respondent, whose coun- sel made the following statement:

(3.) The rent again fell into arrears and the respondent on February 3, 1964 filed the seccrd eviction petition. urder clause (a) of the proviso to section 14 {1) of the Act ior recovery of posseson of the preimses on the ground that the appellant was a habitual defaulter and had failed pay the rent from 1-8-1903 to 3-'-11 -1963 in spite of a notice ot dimand having been served on him on November 25, 1963. It was stated in the patition that the appellant had already obtained once the benefit of sub-section (2) of section 14 of the Act in respect of the premises in dis- putt and that he again made default in payment of rent of those pre- mises for three consecutive months The appellant denied that this was a case of second default. When the respondent applied to the Kent Controller for an order under section 15(1) for direction to the appellant for payriient of arrears of rent, the same was declined on the ground that this was the case of second default, and order under secti-n15 could not be passed The.Additional Controller however, while passing final order, observed th?t no order under section 15 had been made in the earlier eviction proceedings. The appellant-tenant, therefore, could not be said to have enjoyed the benefit of section (2) of section 14 ot the Act. He further observed that as no order under section 15(1) had been made in the eviction petition before him either, the appellant would not be liable to eviction for default. the eviction petition was accorangly, rejected.