(1.) This appeal turns on an interpretation of clause (h) of the proviso to subsection (1) of section 14 of Act 59 of 1958 (hereiafter called "the Act" (The Judgement then reproduces S. 14 (1) (h).
(2.) The elemental y principle of statutory interpretation is that the Wordg employed should be given their plain meaning. The statute is to be construed as to be judiciously meaningful in its own context. Sub-section (1) of section 14 starts with the prohibition that no order or decree for recovery of possession of any premises is to be made by any Court or Controller in favour of a landlord against the tenant and then by enumerating under the proviso separate grounds the provision contains in itself the pre-conditions which when satisfied may lead to an order for recovery of premises by the Controller.
(3.) The word "has", the fourth in clause (h), carries in itself the force of the present tense. It has to be interpreted in terms of the words employed in the opening part of the proviso which are to the effect that the Controller may on an application made to him in the prescribed manner make an order for the recovery of the premises and those words mean that on the date of (he application the tenant must be having a residence either because he may have built the same or may have acquired vacant possession thereof or it may have been allotted to him. Either of the three situations must be there on the date of the application, if that is not so, then clause (h) of the proviso to sub section (1) of section 4 of the Act will have no application. Yet in another way, it may be said that as on the date of the application the tenant should be presently having firm legal rights of residence either in respect of a residence built by him or of which he may have acquired vacant possession or of which he may be having the allotment. This clause has been the subject of some controversial interpretations. It is, therefore, that I have repeated myself and propose to dwell further on a thorough probe into its true meaning.