(1.) The acquisition of the land of Petitioner No. 1 under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter called the Act) was challenged in this writ petition on various grou In the light of the subsequent case-law; however, Shri M. S. Vohra, learned counsel for the petitioners has confined his challenge to the acquisition to the following two grounds only, namely:-
(2.) The defence by the Union of India was that the Collector acting under section 4(1) duly caused public notice of the substance of the notification under section 4 to be given at convenient places in the locality in which the lands, subject of the notification, were situated. Further the objections, if any, were required to be filed by the petitioner No. 1 within 30 days under section 5A(1) of the Act. She did not do so. As the objections were filed long after the expiry of 30 days, they could not be considered by the Collector.
(3.) Before considering the petitioners' contentions on merit it seems to me that the petitioners have disentitled themselves to relief in this Court by the enormous delay in raising these objections. The first objection could have been raised by the petitioner No. 1 soon after 27th November 1961 when due publicity was given to the notification under section 4(1). The second objection should have been raised by the petitioner No. 1 soon after 2nd July 1963 when the objections were filed. It was not necessary for the petitioners to wait for the issue of the notification under section 6 at all. The writ petition was filed in 1967 which was after the expiry of the period of limitation during which a suit raising the above objections would have been required to be filed. The rule laid down by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai, (1964)6 SCR 261 affirmed by the majority in Tilok Chand v. H. B. Munshi (1969)2 SCR 824 that when a writ petition is filed after the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation for the suit it would be regarded as unduly delayed unless there are exceptional circumstances which would justify the entertainment of such a petition after so much delay. There are no such special circumstances justifying, the delay in this case. I hold, therefore, that the present writ petition is liable to be dismissed on this preliminary ground alone.