(1.) This petition under Section 438 Cr.P.C is for grant of bail to the petitioner in the event of arrest in FIR No. 836/2020 dated 17.12.2020, registered at Police Station Samaypur Badli, Delhi for offences under Sections 376/323/509/34 IPC.
(2.) The FIR has been registered on the following averments made by the prosecutrix:
(3.) Ms. Tanya Agarwal, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the prosecutrix has alleged that the petitioner established physical relations with her till February, 2020 but the FIR was lodged in December, 2020. The prosecutrix has not given any reason for the delay but for the saying that her parents were not supporting her. The learned counsel for the petitioner also draws the attention of this Court to a Facebook post of the prosecutrix, dated 13.04.2018, wherein she has posted "Got Married" whereas in the FIR it is stated by the prosecutrix that the alleged marriage took place on 13.04.2019. It is further argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the FIR itself shows that the prosecutrix had refused to marry the petitioner when the petitioner proposed her in October, 2018 and yet there is a Facebook post dated 13.04.2018, that the prosecutrix got married. The learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, states that there is a serious inconsistency in the statement of the prosecutrix inasmuch as in a Facebook post the prosecutrix states that she got married on 13.04.2018 while in her complaint she has stated that the marriage took place on 13.04.2019. The learned counsel for the petitioner states that the petitioner worked as a Sales Associate at "Westside" Karol Bagh from 08.10.2017 till 16.07.2020. On the date of alleged marriage i.e. 13.04.2019, the petitioner was in his office and he has also sought for a report from the office of Westside to demonstrate that on 13.04.2019 he was present in the office. It is further contended that the prosecutrix is a graduate and is from Delhi and she is not a rustic or naive lady. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that a reading of the FIR would show that the prosecutrix knew very well that just putting vermillion on the forehead does not amount to marriage. It is therefore contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that this itself demonstrate that there was no misconception of fact and even if physical relationship was established between the petitioner and the prosecutrix, it was due to her own free will. The learned counsel for the petitioner further contends that the prosecutrix threatened the petitioner that she will file a criminal case against him if he does not marry her by August, 2020. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner filed an application under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C for direction to the police to register a case against the prosecutrix contending that the prosecutrix is harassing him and threatening to file a case of rape against him. She further contends that only after the petitioner filed this complaint against the prosecutrix has the prosecutrix filed the present FIR against the petitioner and therefore the FIR is only for the purpose of harassing the petitioner and put pressure on the petitioner to accede to the demands of the prosecutrix. The learned counsel for the petitioner states that the petitioner has joined investigation and has handed over his phone to the Police. She contends that there is no need for any custodial interrogation because nothing remains to be recovered from him. It is also contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner has roots in the society and he will not flee from justice. The learned counsel for the petitioner places reliance on a judgment of this Court dated 29.07.2010 in CRL.M.C No.3877/2009 titled as Harish Kumar v. State, wherein in similar circumstances FIR has been quashed by this Court. Reliance has also been placed on order dated 20.08.2020, passed by this Court in BAIL APPLN.1700/2020, titled as Pushp Raj Yadav v. State, wherein this Court in similar circumstances has granted anticipatory bail to the petitioner therein.