KAREEMUL HAJAZI Vs. STATE OF NCT OF DELHI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This application has been filed for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. The appellant (Kareemul Hajazi) is the father of the deceased Nasreen, who was married to the respondent No.3 (Khurshid Anwar). The respondent No.2 (Abdul Kayyum) and the respondent No.4 (Razia Khatun) are the father-in-law and the mother-in-law of the deceased Nasreen. The appellant has filed the appeal claiming to be a victim in terms of the proviso to Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code').

(2.) According to the learned counsel for the appellant, there is no provision prescribing the period of limitation for such an appeal filed on behalf of a victim under the proviso to Section 372 of the Code. He further submitted that the period of limitation for an appeal by the State Government or the Central Government against an order of acquittal is 90 days from the date of order appealed from by virtue of Article 114(a) of the Limitation Act, 1963. It was also contended that since the State Government's/Central Government's appeal against an order of acquittal has been permitted to be filed within 90 days, the same logic should apply to the victim's appeal against an order of acquittal and, therefore, the period of limitation ought to be 90 days. He submitted that it is also a well-established principle that where no period of limitation is prescribed by the statute, the courts would have to infer a reasonable period of limitation. Considered in this manner, according to the learned counsel for the appellant, the 90 days period, which has been prescribed for the States' / Centre's appeal, would definitely amount to a reasonable period of limitation. The learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that in the event the period of 90 days is taken as the period of limitation in respect of the appeals by victims against the orders of acquittals, then the present appeal is within limitation. He further submitted that it is only if the period of limitation is taken as 60 days that there would be an alleged delay of 23 days in filing the accompanying appeal. He submitted that, apart from the reasons indicated in the application for condonation of delay, in any event, because of the confusion with regard to the period of limitation for a victim's appeal against acquittal, the delay of 23 days, if any, ought to be condoned.

(3.) On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent Nos. 2 to 4, submitted that the period of limitation which would be applicable in this case would be the period which is prescribed for appeals by convicts against conviction and that period is of 60 days. It was submitted that for the purposes of limitation, the appeal by a victim should be treated at par with an appeal by a convict because both are private individuals and are distinct from the State Government or the Central Government. The latter requires some more time because of the fact that the State machinery does not function as quickly nor are decisions taken as quickly as those by private individuals because the State machinery has an in-built multi-tier system through which the file has to travel. Consequently, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents 2 to 4 submitted that the period of limitation which ought to apply to appeals by victims ought to be 60 days. And, if that were so, the present appeal was clearly beyond time by 23 days for which there was no tangible explanation and, therefore, according to him, the application for condonation of delay ought to be rejected and, so too, the appeal as being barred by time.