(1.) AFTER arguments, it has been agreed between the parties to the suit that the defendants will not create any third party interest in respect of the terrace of the second floor of the suit property. It is made clear that even if first and second floor is transferred by the defendants, they would not be entitled to transfer the roof of the second floor. The application stands disposed of in terms of this order.
(2.) IN CS(OS) 1485/2005, which is the previously instituted suit, the plaintiffs, i.e. Shri Goldy and Kuldeep Kumar are seeking injunction restraining Mrs. Rekha Vohra Bhalla, the defendant in the suit, from taking possession of the roof of the second floor of House No.I-1, Jangpura(B), New Delhi and from raising any construction on it. They are also seeking injunction restraining the defendant from climbing up or using the stairs leading from ground floor to the top floor of property No. I-1, Jangpura(B), New Delhi, from gate-A or otherwise. Another relief claimed by the plaintiffs in this suit is an injunction restraining the defendants from causing any disturbance, hindrance etc. in their ingress and egress through gate at point A shown in the site plan and storing anything on that point. The plaintiffs in this suit have also claimed an injunction restraining the defendant in the suit from obstructing gate- C and parking their vehicles on the ground floor. They have also sought a mandatory injunction directing the defendant to remove the bricks and other building materials alleged to have been thrown by her on the roof of the second floor of the property.
(3.) I have perused the site plans and the photographs filed by the plaintiffs. A perusal of these documents would show that there are three gates marked as gates A, B & C in property No. I-1, Jangpura(B), New Delhi. Gate-A opens in the drive way but is just opposite the staircase leading to the upper floors. This gate has admittedly been locked by the defendant in the suit. Prima facie, it appears to me that the occupants of the upper floors are also entitled to use this gate since it is situated in front of the staircase leading to the upper floors. The defendant is, therefore, directed to provide one key of the lock which she has put on gate- A to the plaintiffs in this suit within three weeks. As regard gate-B, the learned counsel for the plaintiffs very fairly concedes that this gate seems to be intended for the use of the occupants of the ground floor and basement. As regards gate-C, which opens in the drive way, I notice that in the sale deed executed in favour of the plaintiffs in this suit, no right for parking of vehicles has been given to the purchaser. Therefore, prima facie, I am of the view that the plaintiffs in this suit are not entitled to use this gate. The learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs states that the plaintiffs have proportionate rights in the land on which this building has been constructed and in fact have has been using the drive way for parking of the cars till the year 2005 when this gate was locked by the defendant. This, however, is disputed by the learned counsel for the defendant.